Utah Law Review
Volume 2018 | Number 1

Article 4

2-2018

Guest Species: Rethinking Our Approach to
Biodiversity in the Anthropocene
Karrigan Börk

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Börk, Karrigan (2018) "Guest Species: Rethinking Our Approach to Biodiversity in the Anthropocene," Utah Law Review: Vol. 2018 :
No. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2018/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Law Review by an
authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.

GUEST SPECIES: RETHINKING OUR APPROACH TO BIODIVERSITY
IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
Karrigan Börk*
Abstract
Western environmental law rests on an outdated philosophy that only
fully “natural” places, species, and ecosystems should receive full
protection, while human influenced places, species, and ecosystems are
lesser habitats not worthy of full-throated protection. As we move into the
Anthropocene—a dawning geologic age marked by the emergence of
humanity as the dominant force shaping the natural world—this simplistic
view loses its power to guide our decisionmaking. In a world where more
than 75% of ice free land shows evidence of human alteration, if
anthropogenic species, places, or ecosystems are not worth protecting,
then there simply is not enough left to protect.
This Article examines management of nonnative species to illustrate
the problems with using the false dichotomy between nature and humanity
to determine what is environmentally good or environmentally bad.
Nonnative species in North America cause more than $120 billion per year
in damages. But the broad narrative of evil invasive species obfuscates
something important—many nonnative species offer important cultural,
economic, and environmental benefits that outweigh their negative
impacts. The existing legal literature virtually ignores these species and
the moral and legal questions they raise.
In light of the Anthropocene and the philosophical and regulatory
readjustment it requires, we should not vilify all nonnative species, but
rather evaluate them on their own merits. This Article provides case
studies of several guest species, a neologism I use to describe the
nonnative species that we welcome into our ecosystems. Guest species
meet human needs and wants and offer environmental benefits, but our
environmental laws and administrative decisions fail to honestly address
the costs and benefits of welcoming these species. I conclude that we must,
in limited cases, welcome guest as valuable ecosystem components worthy
of protection. Guest species provide an example of the hard decisions and
novel approaches involved in managing our new nature.

* © 2018 Karrigan Börk. Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law. Ph.D. in Ecology (Conservation Biology), U.C. Davis, J.D.,
Stanford Law School, B.A. in Environmental Policy and B.S. in Biology, University of
Kansas. The author would like to thank Dan Tarlock, from IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law; Peter Moyle, from the University of California, Davis; and my McGeorge colleagues
Frank Gevurtz, John Kirlin, Stephen Cody, and Rachael Salcido for their constructive
feedback and Monica Sharum for her help tracking down difficult-to-obtain sources.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 29, 2016, an influential group of geologists, known as the Working
Group on the “Anthropocene” (“AWG”),1 recommended that the International
Geological Congress formally adopt the Anthropocene as the newest geologic
epoch.2 The Anthropocene marks the beginning of a planetary scale of influence for
human activities, and a brief review of select global anthropogenic impacts begins
to give a sense of the scale of global changes reflected in the recommendation:
widespread deposition of plastic, a humanmade substance that is now “virtually
ubiquitous” across the globe;3 increased carbon dioxide concentration and emission
rates, resulting from increased fossil fuel burning; 4 increased global temperatures;5
the radiocarbon bomb spike, a spike in the radioactive isotope Carbon-14 that
resulted from the relatively widespread testing of nuclear weapons in the 1940s and
1950s;6 increased nitrate pollution worldwide, due to the production of nitrogen
fertilizer via the Haber-Bosch process beginning in 1913, which has increased the
amount of bioavailable nitrogen on Earth’s surface by 120%;7 lead, deposited in ice
and sediments in unprecedented amounts from leaded gasoline combustion;8 the
presence of anthropogenic persistent organic pollutants;9 and widespread extinction
and other changes in biodiversity.10
These global changes impact ecosystems at a local level. Climate change—
resulting in extended drought, increased fire frequency, increased ocean
acidification, and other broad impacts—produces significant changes in ecosystems

1

The AWG undertook its work at the request of the Sub-commission on Quaternary
Stratigraphy, a part of the International Commission on Stratigraphy, which is itself a part of
the International Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS). Letter from Jan Zalasiewicz & Mark
Williams, Working Grp. on the Anthropocene, to Potential Members 1 (2009),
https://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene/ [https://perma.cc/P8WF7PNN]. IUGS “is one of the World’s largest scientific organizations. It encourages
international co-operation and participation in the earth sciences in relation to human
welfare . . . . IUGS has over 120 members representing over a million geoscientists.” IUGS
SECRETARIAT, IUGS, THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF GEOLOGICAL SCIENCES 1 (2014),
http://iugs.org/uploads/IUGS_Flyer-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF44-XN4E].
2
Media Note: Anthropocene Working Group, U. LEICESTER (Aug. 29, 2016),
http://www2.le.ac.uk/offices/press/press-releases/2016/august/media-note-anthropoceneworking-group-awg [https://perma.cc/FG99-8ZM5]. A subset of the working group spelled
out the recommendation’s scientific underpinning with a paper in the journal Science. Colin
N. Waters et al., The Anthropocene Is Functionally and Stratigraphically Distinct from the
Holocene, 351 SCI. 137, aad2622-1 (2016).
3
Waters et al., supra note 2, at aad2622-3.
4
Id. at aad2622-1.
5
Id. at aad2622-2.
6
Id. at aad2622-5.
7
Id. at aad2622-4.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at aad2622-7 to 2-8.
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everywhere.11 “Ecological changes in the phenology and distribution of plants and
animals are occurring in all well-studied marine, freshwater, and terrestrial groups.
These observed changes are heavily biased in the directions predicted from global
warming and have been linked to local or regional climate change . . . .”12 These
changes are long term and will lead to significant changes in ecosystem structure
and function, changing both the species that can survive in a given location and the
ecosystem benefits people will receive from their ecosystems.13 And climate is just
the most significant of the many anthropogenic changes affecting ecosystems.14
Increases in global nitrogen supplies through industrial fixation of nitrogen
accelerate biodiversity losses resulting from plant extinctions, degrade coastal
ecosystems, acidify soils and freshwater ecosystems, and ultimately reduce soil
fertility.15 Many, perhaps most, ecosystems are changing, moving toward a future
that has no analog in past or current natural systems.16 Ecosystem stability in the
Anthropocene is a pipe dream.
This is a serious problem for environmental law. In the late 1960s, amidst the
birth of our system of modern environmental law,17 policymakers turned to ecology
for a scientific foundation for the new laws.18 Most ecologists in the 1970s embraced
a teleological view of ecosystems as entities moving through successive stages to a
fixed endpoint, where the ecosystems would maintain themselves in equilibrium
through some form of homeostasis: a balance of nature concept.19 This concept is
straightforward, intuitive, and wrong.20
11

Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., Attributing Physical and Biological Impacts to
Anthropogenic Climate Change, 453 NATURE 353, 355 (2008).
12
Camille Parmesan, Ecological and Evolutionary Responses to Recent Climate
Change, 37 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY EVOLUTION & SYSTEMATICS 637, 637 (2006).
13
Yann Hautier et al., Anthropogenic Environmental Changes Affect Ecosystem
Stability via Biodiversity, 348 SCI. 336, 340 (2015).
14
Gerald C. Nelson et al., Anthropogenic Drivers of Ecosystem Change: An Overview,
11 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 2, art. 29 (2006), https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/
art29/ [https://perma.cc/2WTT-QE92].
15
Peter M. Vitousek et al., Human Alteration of the Global Nitrogen Cycle: Sources
and Consequences, 7 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 737, 737 (1997).
16
John W. Williams & Stephen T. Jackson, Novel Climates, No-Analog Communities,
and Ecological Surprises, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 475, 475–80 (2007).
17
Gary Kroll, The “Silent Springs” of Rachel Carson: Mass Media and the Origins of
Modern Environmentalism, 10 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 403, 403–04 (2001).
18
From the National Environmental Policy Act’s (NEPA) requirement that agencies
undertake analysis of the ecosystem wide impacts of major federal government actions to
the Endangered Species Act’s focus on ecosystem level protection, albeit through a single
species approach, many modern environment laws followed ecology’s focus on ecosystems
as a unit for protection.
19
See Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 847–73 (1994).
20
As the field of ecology continued to develop, data from large scale field studies
increasingly challenged the balance of nature idea; the data simply did not fit hypotheses
spawned by this view. As the balance of nature view started to lose its dominance, a new
view, predicated on ecosystems as systems constantly in flux, seemed to be a much better fit
with field observations and thus emerged the mainstream scientific view. Id.
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Nevertheless, the prevailing balance of nature view echoed and reinforced
several touchstone beliefs of the broader environmental movement. As Dan Tarlock
and Fred Bosselman note, “[t]he idea of . . . equilibrium fell on fertile ground. For
centuries, many theologically inclined students of science had inferred a balance of
nature, divinely provided until the disrupters of the Garden of Eden bungled
things.”21 From this view, they note, conservationists concluded “humans should
search to fit themselves into the framework of natural processes so that a condition
of permanent stability could be re-established.”22 Aldo Leopold’s influential land
ethic encapsulates the view: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”23
The balance of nature view is even enshrined in the Senate Report on the Endangered
Species Act, which states that species “perform vital biological services to maintain
‘a balance of nature’ within their environments.”24
This worldview—the balance of nature concept—invites a corollary view, one
that paints human influences as foreign to ecosystems and humanity itself as
something outside of nature. Taken together, these two views formed an ethical basis
for much modern environmental work—nature had a natural balance that persisted
as long as humanity stayed out of it.25 This view, which places humanity outside of
the natural system and assumes that humanity generally mucks things up when it
intrudes, is termed the separatist view,26 as opposed to the holist view, which places
humanity squarely within nature, functioning like other organisms as a part of an
ecosystem.27 The separatist view creates an easy dichotomy, where natural systems
are environmentally good and worth protecting, while anthropogenic systems are
environmentally bad and an assault on the natural landscape.28 Our modern
environmental laws and our popular image of nature generally build on the balance
of nature concept and a separatist view of humanity, but, particularly in light of the
Anthropocene, these concepts no longer make sense.

21

Id. at 855.
Id.
23
ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 224–
25 (1949). Note, however, that some commentators believe Leopold’s ethic did not stem
from an equilibrium view. See Eric T. Freyfogle, A Sand County Almanac at 50: Leopold in
the New Century, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10058, 10063–64 (2000) (suggesting that Leopold
believed anthropogenic damage resulted not from disruption of a static balance of nature, but
from altering environments too violently and rapidly).
24
S. Rep. No. 93-307, at 2 (1973).
25
Daniel B. Botkin, Adjusting Law to Nature’s Discordant Harmonies, 7 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 25, 26 (1996) (“[T]he Balance of Nature myth has three basic features: First,
Nature, undisturbed by human influences, achieves a permanency of form and structure that
persists indefinitely. Second, this permanent condition is the best condition for Nature: best
for other creatures, best for the environment, and best for humans. Third, when disturbed
from this perfect state, Nature is capable of returning to it.”).
26
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 1, 5 (1996).
27
Id. at 4–5.
28
Id.
22
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The false dichotomy that paints humans and ecosystems as somehow separate
leads to irrational policy decisions. Consider our management of nonnative species.
Wild nonnative species, those species that humanity has moved away from the
habitat where they evolved into a new habitat where they have naturalized, differ
from native species only in that humanity precipitated their arrival in the new habitat.
Species frequently move into new habitats on their own29 without direct
anthropogenic assistance, and we treat these species as natural parts of their new
ecosystems.30 In contrast, wild nonnative species are often treated with disdain even
a hundred years after their human mediated migration to a new habitat.31 Certainly,
many human precipitated introductions prove disastrous, and society should not
condone most new introductions, intentional or otherwise.32 But some introduced
species have integrated rather seamlessly into their new ecosystems and have
evolved adaptions to their new environments. They provide valuable ecosystem
services, hold important roles in the local ecosystems themselves, and often survive
well in the disturbed habitats found in many human dominated ecosystems. They do
not seem to be doing any more harm to native species than other native species
occupying similar soles in the same ecosystem. Removal of these species is both
nearly impossible and shortsighted.33
Nevertheless, conservationists often refer to these species with jingoistic
language borrowed from nationalist movements, overlooking the beneficial roles
some nonnative species play. The nonnative species, due to their anthropogenic
origin, are treated with disdain and may be held up as “enemy species.”34 But treating
these species differently due solely to their history discounts the integral human role
in ecosystems. As we enter the Anthropocene and face the specter of climate change,
we will have to take a more interventionist approach to managing ecosystems, not
less.35 This will include moving some species from their current habitats to locations
where they can survive in future climate regimes, a practice called assisted
migration. This process has already begun on an experimental basis. We cannot
afford to treat these migrated species as lesser citizens in their new environments.
More broadly, we should, be judging all nonnative species not on their method of
migration, but instead on their own merits. Singling out a species that has survived
and integrated well with an otherwise heavily impacted ecosystem solely because
we brought it there devalues species that may play important roles in maintaining
biodiversity in the Anthropocene.

29

Albeit at rates much lower than are seen in the world now.
See, e.g., Godfrey Hewitt, The Genetic Legacy of the Quaternary Ice Ages, 405
NATURE 907, 907–12 (2000) (discussing the extensive recolonization of the planet after the
most recent ice ages. The recolonizing species are all recognized as native species in their
current ranges, despite their relatively recent arrival in those areas).
31
See infra text accompanying notes 62–90.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See infra Part III.
35
See id.
30
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In some ways, we have already implicitly begun this process of changing
attitudes; many state agencies actively manage some nonnative species as game
species or otherwise conserve their populations.36 But, in some cases, federal courts
and federal agencies have stepped in to force states to shrink or eliminate these
populations.37 In other cases, federal law itself protects nonnative species, such as in
the Wild Horses and Burro Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.38 These
nonnative species also play important cultural roles, as with the ring-necked
pheasant, a popular game bird venerated in hunting circles across the country.39 In
short, our thinking toward and policy concerning these species has been, at best,
muddled, and we should address these species on a more consistent basis.
Toward this end, I propose the term guest species, a neologism to describe the
nonnative species that we welcome into our ecosystems through active conservation.
Technically, I define guest species as naturalized nonnative species which humans
have introduced, intentionally or accidently,40 and which we actively conserve
because we benefit from having them in the wild. Viewed in the harsh light of the
Anthropocene, guest species provide a good example of the hard decisions and novel
approaches involved in managing our new nature.
Section II discusses the practical importance of our outdated view of the role of
humanity within ecosystems. Section III undertakes a case study of several guest
species to show how environmental laws generally fail to honestly address the costs
and benefits of welcoming these species, based on the false dichotomy between
human and natural. Section IV builds on these case studies, calls for a reassessment
of normative environmental values in light of the Anthropocene, and proposes that
guest species be evaluated not on their origins but on their own merit. Finally,
Section V briefly concludes.
II. REJECTING THE FALSE DICHOTOMY—WHY THE SEPARATIST VIEW CANNOT
SURVIVE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
Climate change. Rampant over fertilization and eutrophication leading
widespread algae blooms. Plastic pollution. Biodiversity loss. Ocean acidification.
Widespread air and water pollution. The idea of the Anthropocene highlights all of
these ongoing anthropogenic environmental impacts. But a recitation of the impacts,
no matter how dire, does not get at the heart of the significance of declaring a
beginning to the Anthropocene. These are not new facts—we know that we are
36

See id.
See id.
38
Gary W. Witmer et al., Management of Invasive Vertebrates in the United States: An
Overview, 56 MANAGING VERTEBRATE INVASIVE SPECIES 127, 135 (2007).
39
See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING,
HUNTING, AND WILDLIFE-ASSOCIATED RECREATION 26 (2011).
40
For accidentally introduced species, I use the term “by-product introductions,”
because they enter new systems as the byproduct of human activities. They are not accidents
in the true sense, in that these introductions are entirely predictable. See Peter B. Moyle &
Michael P. Marchetti, Predicting Invasion Success: Freshwater Fishes in California as a
Model, 56 BIOSCIENCE 515, 516 (2006).
37
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damaging our environment, and we have known that for decades. The significance
of the Anthropocene is in the labeling: the realization and public recognition that we
have the power to enact irreversible global change, and that we are in fact the
primary force making those changes at a global level right now. Names matter.
Labels matter. A medical diagnosis does not change the underlying biological facts,
but, inarguably, such a diagnosis marks a turning point for the patient. In the same
way, marking the start of the Anthropocene will not change the underlying
environmental impacts, but it can, and indeed must, mark a turning point in our
relationship with the environment. The age of the Anthropocene requires us to
reassess our fundamental view of the relationship between humanity and our
environment in order to better protect the nature we have left.
There are certainly risks to undertaking such a readjustment,41 but our changing
relationship with nature requires it. Many species listed under the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”) illustrates that changing cannot recover without our help.
Biologists call these species “conservation reliant,” defined as species that are not
biologically self sufficient, but instead require ongoing human intervention to
maintain their populations.42 According to the best estimates, 84% of species listed
as threatened or endangered under the ESA qualify as conservation reliant: 84% of
invertebrates, 85% of plants, and 81% of vertebrates.43 Conservation reliance is
likely to spread under any of the projected climate futures. “Twenty to thirty percent
of species will face an ‘increased’ risk of extinction if average global temperature
rises more than 1.5 to 2.5 degrees Celsius [and] . . . by 2050 up to two-thirds of
species will need to migrate or be moved to new habitats to survive.”44
For these species to survive, they will require continuous human intervention.
Maintenance of the ecosystems they rely on now requires human management, and
if, as the separatist view suggests, ecosystems impacted by humanity are
compromised and somehow worth less than natural ecosystems, then we will be
degrading ecosystems in an effort to save them. While examining the human role in
protecting endangered species in her seminal work on The Importance of Being Wild,
Holly Doremus, argued that:
Protecting wild species and ecosystems means preserving them in a
condition that permits them to function, to the greatest extent possible,
41

See Walter Kuhlmann, Making the Law More Ecocentric: Responding to Leopold
and Conservation Biology, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 133, 165 (1996) (noting that
“[u]nfortunately, while ecological theorists, historians and others often propose revisions to
ecological thinking in a good faith attempt to craft responsible stewardship of resources
already influenced heavily by human occupation, their concepts of managed nature are
readily, and foreseeably, appropriated by managers and legislators eager to maintain business
as usual for the dominance of resource extraction.”).
42
Daniel J. Rohlf et al., Conservation-Reliant Species: Toward a Biology-Based
Definition, 64 BIOSCIENCE 601, 604 (2014).
43
J. Michael Scott et al., Conservation-Reliant Species and the Future of Conservation,
3 CONSERVATION LETTERS 91, 93 (2010).
44
Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource
Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 181 (2010).
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without human intervention. It also means leaving the future of those
species or ecosystems to the ordinary processes of evolution, rather than
steering them deliberately toward some human vision of usefulness or
beauty.45
This guidance is true, as far as it goes, but it provides little guidance in most
situations that conservation biologists face. What does it mean in ecosystems that
are failing, where listed species need constant gardening in order to survive? In a
future where, if we want functioning ecosystems with the species we try to protect,
we will have to make and manage those ecosystems? In short, the false dichotomy
between good, natural systems and bad, human impacted systems is no longer
tenable.
The impact of the false dichotomy/separatist view on our system of
environmental law has received little direct examination, although a few scholars
have examined these issues. In at least one case, an exclusive focus on anthropogenic
impacts led to environmental law that fails to address targeted contaminants: Weiner
reports that “the Clean Water Act of 1972 defines ‘pollution’ as ‘man-made or maninduced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological and radiological integrity of
water,’ such that non-human sources of contamination (e.g., microbes) are not
subject to regulation.”46 Rachael Salcido and I also examined the role of separatist
thinking in the EPA’s recently promulgated47 (and recently stayed)48 rule defining
the jurisdictional waters of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).49 The rule largely
excludes manmade features from protection under the CWA, including “[a]rtificially
irrigated areas that would revert to dry land should application of irrigation water to
that area cease”;50 “[a]rtificial, constructed lakes or ponds created by excavating
and/or diking dry land such as farm and stock watering ponds, irrigation ponds,
settling basins, log cleaning ponds, cooling ponds, or fields flooded for rice
growing”;51 “[a]rtificial reflecting pools or swimming pools created by excavating
and/or diking dry land”;52 “[w]ater-filled depressions created in dry land incidental
to mining or construction activity, including pits excavated for obtaining fill, sand
or gravel that fill with water”;53 “[s]tormwater control features constructed to
convey, treat, or store stormwater that are created in dry land,”54 and many ditches.55
45

Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild, 23
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1999).
46
Wiener, supra note 26, at 9.
47
Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified in scattered parts
of 40 C.F.R.).
48
In re E.P.A., 803 F.3d 804, 808–09 (6th Cir. 2015).
49
Rachael Salcido & Karrigan Börk, Ditching Our Innocence: The Clean Water Act in
the Age of the Anthropocene, 46 ENVTL. L. 415, 423 (2016).
50
Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,107.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Salcido & Börk, supra note 49, at 433–36.
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These habitats often play significant roles in their local ecosystems,56 regardless of
whether they are manmade or natural. After reviewing a number of potential reasons
for the exclusion of these habitats from the protection of the CWA, we ultimately
concluded that this decision “appears to be a capitulation by the agencies to the easy
argument that manmade places often are not worth protecting.”57 The problem with
this argument, as discussed above, lies in the pervasiveness of humanmade places
or places significantly influenced by anthropogenic changes. Faced with pending
collapses in ecosystems worldwide,58 humanity is increasingly taking on a formative
role in ecosystems.59 In a world where more than 75% of the ice free land shows
evidence of human alteration,60 if humanmade places or places that humanity must
maintain are not worth protecting, then there simply is not enough left to protect.
The implicit view of the human role in ecosystems also plays a key role in the
way law and science view nonnative species. Ecologists differentiate species that
colonize new territory as nonnative or invasive when those species arrive through
anthropogenic methods, whether through intentional or by-product introductions.61
Species arriving of their own accord are deemed to have migrated or dispersed into
new habitat, where they are considered native, or, if not native, at least on equal
footing with the species that are native to that location. As discussed below, the
anthropogenic introductions often, but not always, cause problems, and such species
are treated as second class citizens of the ecosystems they inhabit. This dichotomous
view of the world often leads to a reactionary approach, with managers harshly
regulating or even seeking to eliminate introduced species. As demonstrated below,
this approach does not always make sense.
III. GUEST SPECIES: RETHINKING THE ROLE OF NONNATIVE SPECIES
Conservation biologists relate a parade of evil invasive species: the zebra
mussel, which is currently invading reservoirs and lakes across the United States and
causing roughly $1 billion in annual damage;62 the rats that plague cities, to the tune
of $19 billion annually;63 the brown tree snake, which has driven over 75% of native
forest birds in Guam to extinction;64 Asian carps, which may cost $18 billion to

56

Id. at 448–50.
Id. at 452.
58
See Hautier et al., supra note 13, at 336–39; Parmesan, supra note 12, at 646.
59
Nelson et al., supra note 14, at 29.
60
Richard J. Hobbs et al., Novel Ecosystems: Implications for Conservation and
Restoration, 24 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 599, 600 (2009).
61
See supra text accompanying note 30.
62
David Pimentel et al., Update on the Environmental and Economic Costs Associated
with Alien-Invasive Species in the United States, 52 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 273, 279 (2005).
Most of the costs are related to agriculture, not natural ecosystems. Id. at 274.
63
Id.
64
Id.
57
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control;65 or kudzu, the infamous foot per day vine that covered the South.66 The
environmental problems associated with invasive species are well documented,67
with total economic cost estimates as high as $120 billion per year, excluding the
difficult to calculate environmental costs.68 An estimated 5,000 plants, twenty
mammal species, 100 bird species, fifty reptile or amphibian species, 140 fish
species, 4,500 arthropod species, and ninety mollusk species have become
naturalized in ecosystems in North America.69 These figures include only those
species introduced from outside North America; adding intracontinental
translocations would push the totals much higher.70
These naturalized species present the primary extinction risk for almost half of
the listed species in the United States71 and are the second most common threat to
imperiled species worldwide.72 At this point, it is difficult to overstate the impacts
of introduced species. They are a key aspect of most ecosystems and they are not
going away. But the broad narrative of evil invasive species obfuscates important
aspects of the problem. Many nonnative species come from deliberate, human
mediated introductions, and some of these introductions still provide us with
significant benefits. For example, excluding pest species, most mammal
introductions were deliberate efforts to increase available game species for hunting,
food, and pelts.73 Many nonnative naturalized plant species have also been spread
due to deliberate introductions.74 A detailed state by state analysis of introduced
fishes found that introduced fish species made up anywhere from 10% of the total
species in eastern areas up to 30–60% of fish species in the west, with most of these

65
Todd Spangler, $18 billion would keep Asian carp out of Great Lakes, USA TODAY
(Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/06/asian-carp-reportgreat-lakes/4348241/ [https://perma.cc/CCD2-VBB9].
66
Bill Flinch, The True Story of Kudzu, the Vine That Never Truly Ate the South,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Sept. 2015), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/truestory-kudzu-vine-ate-south-180956325/ [https://perma.cc/6733-R8BB]; see also Irwin N.
Forseth & Anne F. Innis, Kudzu (Pueraria montana): History, Physiology, and Ecology
Combine to Make a Major Ecosystem Threat, 23 CRITICAL REV. PLANT SCI. 401, 401–14
(2004) (discussing the threatening nature of Kudzu).
67
Pimentel et al., supra note 62, at 274.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 273. Scientists estimate that over 50,000 nonnative species have been
introduced to the United States, including those that have not escaped to the wild. Id. That
total depends on a very broad definition of alien invasive species, including ornamental
plants, cattle, cats, dogs, and other organisms not traditionally included in the list of invasive
species. Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 275–79.
72
Céline Bellard et al., Alien Species as a Driver of Recent Extinctions, 12 BIOLOGY
LETTERS 1, 1–4 (2016), http://rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/roybiolett/12/2/2015
0623.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R9E-4XBU].
73
Witmer et al., supra note 38, at 128.
74
Richard N. Mack & Marianne Erneberg, The United States Naturalized Flora:
Largely the Product of Deliberate Introductions, 89 ANNALS MO. BOTANICAL GARDEN 176,
176 (2002).
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transplanted species serving as additional game species or forage for game species.75
Humanity exhibits a long history of translocating species,76 heralded in the biblical
flood story77 and repeated throughout much of human history, with Romans
translocating carp throughout Europe and other Europeans translocating salmonids
into otherwise fishless alpine lakes.78
Many of these introductions have gone awry,79 and given this poor track record
and the nearly insurmountable challenges associated with properly managing
introductions,80 we should approach any new introductions with more than a little
hesitation and a strong sense of the precautionary principle. Nevertheless, through
careful matching of species with environments, sheer volume, or pure dumb luck,
some of our past introductions have led to establishment of species in North America
that we have come to rely on; that serve important cultural, environmental, or other
purposes; or that we just like having around; and that bring with them ecosystem
impacts that may be tolerable in light of the benefits the species offer.
A. Beneficial Nonnatives
This reconsideration of nonnative species provides another list, a list of
nonnative species that we tend to value. Consider a few examples: honey bees,
arriving in North America from Europe in the seventeenth century;81 the earth worms
colloquially known as night crawlers, which also came from Europe;82 pheasants,
75

P.B. Moyle, Fish Introductions into North America: Patterns and Ecological Impact,
in ECOLOGY OF BIOLOGICAL INVASIONS OF NORTH AMERICA AND HAWAII 27, 27–29 (Harold
A. Mooney & James A. Drake eds., 1986); Witmer et al., supra note 38, at 132.
76
Devin Kenney, A Goat Too Far?: State Authority to Translocate Species On and Off
(and Around) Federal Land, 8 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 303, 317 (2015)
(“[T]he translocation power is as fundamental and ancient a power as any, and is central to
wildlife management authority.”).
77
Genesis 8:15–19 (New International Version) (“Then God said to Noah, ‘Come out
of the ark, you and your wife and your sons and their wives. Bring out every kind of living
creature that is with you—the birds, the animals, and all the creatures that move along the
ground—so they can multiply on the earth and be fruitful and increase in number on it.’ So
Noah came out, together with his sons and his wife and his sons’ wives. All the animals and
all the creatures that move along the ground and all the birds—everything that moves on
land—came out of the ark, one kind after another.”).
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Moyle, supra note 75, at 27.
79
Daniel Simberloff et al., Introduced Species Policy, Management, and Future
Research Needs, 3 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 12, 13 (2005) (“Where data exist,
however, deliberate introductions account for about half of all problem
introductions.”).
80
See, e.g., Peter B. Moyle et al., The Frankenstein Effect: Impact of Introduced Fishes
on Native Fishes in North America, in FISH CULTURE IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 415, 415
(Richard H. Stroud ed., 1986) (observing that unintended and unanticipated negative
consequences often follow from introductions initially seen as beneficial).
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Tammy Horn, Honey Bees: A History, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Apr. 11, 2008, 1:05 PM),
http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/11/honey-bees-a-history/?r=0 [https://perma.cc/8K
9P-53XW].
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The Trouble with Earthworms, NPR (Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates
/story/story.php?storyId=9105956 [https://perma.cc/PA2Z-2WE4].
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introduced in North America in the late 1800s from China;83 or brown trout,
introduced from Germany in 1883.84 Including translocations within the United
States gives a much longer list, focused on fish species like largemouth bass,
rainbow trout, salmon, brook trout, catfish, striped bass, and northern pike.85
Including anthropogenic range expansion via habitat modification adds a host of
mammals like whitetail deer, fox, and coyotes.86 Recent research has begun to
unpack a number of benefits, both to humanity and to ecosystems, from some of
these nonnative species.
Schlaepfer enumerated four ways nonnative species provide conservation
benefits: (1) providing habitat, food, or trophic subsidies for native species (e.g.
tamarisk providing nesting habitat for listed Southwestern willow flycatchers); (2)
serving as catalysts for the restoration of native species (e.g. nonnative trees modify
degraded land in Puerto Rico, allowing colonization by native trees); (3) serving as
substitutes for extinct ecosystem engineers (e.g. nonnative birds in Hawaii serve
seed dispersal roles once filled by now extinct native birds); and (4) providing
ecosystem services (e.g. nonnative African honey bees filling a role left vacant by
extinct pollinators in Brazil).87 Even species like the eucalyptus tree, often
denigrated as an invasive fire hazard, may create important habitat, as in the case of
the eucalyptus used by overwintering monarch butterflies in California.88 “[T]he
introduction of non-native species has almost always increased the number of

83
MIDWEST PHEASANT STUDY GRP., NATIONAL WILD PHEASANT CONSERVATION
PLAN 1 (2012).
84
Nonindigenous Aquatic Species, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://nas.er.usgs.gov/
queries/FactSheet.aspx?SpeciesID=931 [https://perma.cc/Z6VP-YQXN] (last visited Aug.
5, 2017).
85
See Moyle et al., supra note 75, at 416.
86
Frank Miniter, Embracing 9 of the Non-Native And Invasive Species that We Love to
Hunt and Fish, OUTDOORLIFE (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.outdoorlife.com/articles/hunting/
2016/02/embracing-9-non-native-and-invasive-species-we-love-hunt-and-fish#page-5
[https://perma.cc/7RXR-J9KT]. Coyotes provide a particularly good example of this
phenomena. Daniel H. Thornton & Dennis L. Murray, Influence of Hybridization on Niche
Shifts in Expanding Coyote Populations, 20 DIVERSITY & DISTRIBUTIONS 1355, 1356 (2014)
(“During the 19th and 20th centuries, coyotes expanded from their historic range in the
western United States and Canada to occupy virtually all of North America. This rapid spread
is largely believed to be the result of changing biotic interactions and mediated by
anthropogenic habitat modifications: the elimination of a major competitor across much of
North America (wolves) and the transformation of forest into agriculture and urbanized
lands, which may have increased coyote foraging success or given them a competitive
advantage over species less adept at exploiting agricultural or human dominated
environments.”). Even more broadly, 98% of North American agricultural production comes
from nonnative species. Pimentel et al., supra note 62, at 273.
87
Martin A. Schlaepfer et al., The Potential Conservation Value of Non-Native Species,
25 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 428, 430–33 (2011).
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Erica Goode, Invasive Species Aren’t Always Unwanted, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/science/invasive-species.html [https://perma.cc/EH
N5-4DYY].
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species in a region,”89 and nonnatives are likely to play increasing key roles in future
ecosystems:
[S]ome non-native species may be preadapted or adapt rapidly to . . . novel
ecological conditions . . . . [T]he ability of non-native species to tolerate
and adapt to a broad range of biotic and abiotic conditions, as well as to
expand their ranges rapidly, suggests they may persist under a variety of
future climate scenarios.90
In fact, “non-native species could become increasingly appreciated for their
tolerance and adaptability to novel ecological conditions and their contributions to
ecosystem resilience and to future speciation events.”91 Beyond ecosystem benefits,
“non-native species are integral to the culture and economies of most countries.”92
In 2011, the introduced “pheasants attracted 1.5 million hunters for 10 million days”
of hunting in the United States.93 And although economic costs of nonnative species
are well documented, “[b]y contrast, relatively few researchers have quantified the
economic benefits (e.g., value of pollination by non-native bees, fees paid to hunt
non-native game) derived from non-native species.”94 As a result, we lack “a
comprehensive review of the economic benefits, provided by non-native species,”95
but they are not insignificant.96 Thus, although some introduced species certainly
deserve a healthy dose of infamy, many others are probably good to have around.97
Why has the mixed nature of introduced species been so obscured? This view of
introduced species comes, in part, from the separatist worldview and its false
human/natural dichotomy.
B. Why Do We Need the New Term “Guest Species?”
A recent Nature piece highlights “a pervasive bias against alien species that has
been embraced by the public, conservationists, land managers and policy-makers, as
well by as many scientists, throughout the world.”98 The historical idea of
“nativeness” began with “the English botanist John Henslow in 1835. By the late
89

(2011).
90

Mark A. Davis et al., Don’t Judge Species on Their Origins, 474 NATURE 153, 153

Schlaepfer et al., supra note 87, at 433.
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Id. at 429.
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U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 39, at 26.
94
Schlaepfer et al., supra note 87, at 429.
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Id.
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See id. (“Not all nonnative species cause biological or economic harm, and only a
fraction become established and have an effect that is considered harmful.”).
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Davis et al., supra note 89, at 153. But see Daniel Simberloff, Non-Natives: 141
Scientists Object, 475 NATURE 36, 36 (2011) (“First, most conservation biologists and
ecologists do not oppose non-native species per se—only those targeted by the Convention
on Biological Diversity as threatening ‘ecosystems, habitats or species.’”).
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1840s, botanists had adapted the terms native and alien from common law to help
them distinguish those plants that composed a ‘true’ British flora from artefacts
[sic].”99 Jared Goldstein unpacks this metaphor, noting “[t]he complex ecological
phenomenon of introduced species is made comprehensible through the nationalist
metaphor of foreign invasion.”100 “Once all species are understood in nationalist
terms to be natives somewhere and aliens everywhere else, it is easy to conceive of
the harmful influx of aliens as an invasion.”101 He notes that these same terms apply
to a variety of scenarios: military invasion by a foreign army; disease; invasions of
property and privacy rights; immigration; and generally of corruption of the familiar
and safe by foreign entities and ideas.102
As Goldstein notes, “[t]he choice of metaphor used to describe a phenomenon
plays a fundamental role in shaping understanding of the phenomenon.”103 By
embracing loaded language to describe nonnative species, advocates for efforts to
exclude nonnative species conveyed moral judgments on those species. “[P]roponents of biodiversity preservation and ecological restoration commonly used
military metaphors and exaggerated claims of impending harm to help convey the
message that introduced species are the enemies of man and nature.”104 And, as
Goldstein tells it, this story directly implicates the false humanity/nature dichotomy:
As depicted in invasive species literature, the narrative of invasive species
tells a familiar story. Before the arrival of Columbus, American natives—
that is, native plants and animals—lived in balance and harmony with
surrounding species, as they had for millennia. Native species have ancient
connections with American landscapes and are uniquely adapted to local
conditions. Into this harmonious Eden, aliens arrived and upset the balance
of nature . . . . [A] few of the newcomers preyed on the natives, took away
their land, and displaced them from their long-established homes. These
invaders killed and eliminated many natives. They also brought diseases
for which the natives had no resistance.105
Had the species arrived naturally through storms, migration, range expansion
or the like, they would be considered natural, maybe native, and would not be subject
to such hostility. By relying on the easy shorthand that natural is good and
anthropogenic is bad, conservationists have oversimplified a complex issue and
continue to overlook the benefits offered by some nonnative species. Although some
argue that scientists are already considering species on their merits alone,106
Schlaepfer convincingly argues “[s]cientific and societal perceptions of non-native
99
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species have likely impeded consideration of the potential beneficial effects of nonnative species.”107 They note “language used to describe non-native species in the
scientific literature is frequently scattered with militarized and xenophobic
expressions (e.g., ‘war on aliens’ and ‘American ecosystems under siege by alien
invaders’),”108 hardly the dispassionate language one would expect from
scientists.109 These same studies tend to ignore the increased biodiversity and
economic benefits offered by some (albeit not most)110 nonnative species.111 The
Nature piece discussed above112 argues that:
[T]he practical value of the native-versus-alien species dichotomy in
conservation is declining, and even becoming counterproductive . . . . It is
time for scientists, land managers and policy-makers to ditch this preoccupation with the native–alien dichotomy and embrace more dynamic and
pragmatic approaches to the conservation and management of species—
approaches better suited to our fast-changing planet.113
Although scientists themselves may just use the militarized or xenophobic
language as shorthand, this attitude goes well beyond science into the realm of law
and policy. This same false dichotomy and lazy thinking defines the law’s approach
to established populations of nonnative species, leading to nonsensical outcomes or
outcomes that fail to account for the positive and negative impacts of nonnative
species.
In order to promote a less emotionally fraught consideration of established
populations of nonnative species, I propose a new term that more accurately captures
our relationship to the nonnative species we invite in and make comfortable: guest
species.114 More precisely, I define guest species as naturalized nonnative species
107

Schlaepfer et al., supra note 87, at 429.
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a crowded nomenclatural space. Many terms cover the variations on invasive species: “pest,
weed, disease, and noxious . . . exotic, alien . . . nonindigenous, non-native . . . invasive
108

184

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

which humans have introduced, intentionally or accidently, and which we actively
conserve because we benefit from having them in the wild. Guest species include
only naturalized species, that is, those species already successfully reproducing in
the wild. By definition, guest species must be nonnative (hence guests), and must be
species that we actively conserve because we like having them around. Conservation
in this sense can include both active conservation through habitat improvement or
elimination of predators and competitors, or conservation through restrictions on
removal of a species from the wild, as in catch or possession limits for fish species.
In addition to the three examples I highlight below (goats, striped bass, and trout),
other examples include pheasant in North America, largemouth or smallmouth bass
in habitats where they are not native, wild horses and burros, eucalyptus trees across
California, or the Aldabra giant tortoise on the Indian Ocean islands.115 One might
even argue that we ourselves fit the definition, although that moves the term beyond
the realm of usefulness.
In some ways, the term guest species is itself a bit of a misnomer, in that guests
tend to visit and then go away. These species are undeniably staying in our
ecosystems. But the guest species term is most appropriate because, like guest
workers, these species are here because we want them here. We have, to use an
ecology term, a mutualistic relationship with our guest species,116 just as we do with
human guests in our homes. In ecology, two species have a mutualistic relationship
when both species benefit from the relationship (as opposed to a commensal or
parasitic relationship).117 The guest species term recognizes this mutually beneficial
arrangement and removes the stigma associated with the many more xenophobic
terms attached to nonnative species.118
C. Federal and State Laws Addressing Nonnative Species
Federal and state invasive species laws present a mishmash of overlapping and
inconsistent mandates which fail to address the full scope of the nonnative species
problems, as has been well discussed in other venues.119 In light of the many
discussions of this topic, this section focuses on the way this framework of laws
addresses guest species. This framework addresses guest species at best
inadequately for two reasons. First, federal and state invasive species law focus
largely on prevention of new invasions, not management of existing invasions; and
alien . . . ‘harmful aquatic organism’ [and] . . . ‘quarantine pest.’” None, however, speak to
this category of species, and, as shown infra, this category merits special attention.).
115
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guest species are, by definition, invariably existing invasions. Second, most
definitions of invasive species focus on those species that inflict harm, or harm that
outweighs their benefits; and guest species sometimes slip by under this
exception.120 But some state and federal laws still address guest species, and a
discussion of guest species issues would be incomplete without addressing this
framework.
The Lacey Act—the primary federal law directly addressing nonnative
species—provides a good example of the first issue. The Act seeks “to prevent the
‘unwise’ introduction of foreign birds and animals.”121 It uses two mechanisms to
achieve that goal: (1) criminalizing import, export, or transport of any fish, wildlife,
or plant in violation of federal, state, tribal, or foreign law,122 and (2) barring import
into the United States of species on a (short) black list maintained by the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service.123 The Lacey Act’s focus on preventing establishment of new
populations on nonnative species leaves out guest species almost entirely.
The next major component of federal law comes from a 1999 executive order
on nonnative species, (“E.O. 13112”) which includes both new introductions and
existing populations, but skirts guest species through a focus on the most harmful
species. The order restricts agencies from introducing or promoting invasive species,
which could include managing existing populations.124 But the order limits “invasive
species” to any “alien species whose introduction does or is likely to cause economic
or environmental harm or harm to human health.”125 The order then limits its
restriction on introductions and the like to only invasive species.126 Moreover, it
120
Olympia Bowker, A Vague Invasion: The Inadequacy of Invasive Species
Definitions in Reaching Federal and State Goals, Illustrated by Application of Ammophilia
arenaria to Coastal Dune Preservation, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 579, 605 (2014) (noting that
“[a]nother caveat of the federal definition is that invasive heavily depends upon the negative
effects those species have on the economy: [i]f a species from another continent is beneficial
to the economy, it is not invasive despite where its origins may lie.”).
121
Id. Perhaps most notably, the Lacey Act also “authorize[d] the introduction and
preservation of game, song, and insectivorous wild birds.” Graham, supra note 119, at 35
(citations omitted).
122
16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2012).
123
18 U.S.C. § 42 (2012); see also 50 C.F.R. §§ 16.1 to 16.33 (2017).
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Exec. Order No. 13112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999). This order follows the
original executive order on nonnative species, Exec. Order No. 11987, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,949
(May 25, 1977). That order, from 1977, defined “Exotic species” as “all species of plants
and animals not naturally occurring, either presently or historically, in any ecosystem of the
United States.” Id. The order then directed all executive agencies to restrict the introduction
of exotic species into the natural ecosystems on public lands and to “encourage the States,
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natural ecosystems of the United States.” Id. But the order does not apply to the introduction
of any species “if the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of the Interior finds that such
introduction or exportation will not have an adverse effect on natural ecosystems.” Id. The
second executive order is generally similar but provides a more explicit exemption for
beneficial species. Id.
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prohibits agencies from encouraging actions likely to promote invasive species,
“unless . . . the agency has determined and made public its determination that the
benefits of such actions clearly outweigh the potential harm caused by invasive
species.”127 Thus, the order focuses only on those species whose introduction does,
or is likely to cause, economic or environmental harm or harm to human health, or
those whose harm is outweighed by the benefits of actions incidentally promoting
the species.
The executive order created the National Invasive Species Council (“NISC”)
“to coordinate and ensure complementary, cost-effective Federal activities regarding
invasive species.”128 The NISC provided additional clarification on the definition of
invasive species, requiring “[f]or a non-native organism to be considered an invasive
species in the policy context, the negative effects that the organism causes or is likely
to cause are deemed to outweigh any beneficial effects.”129 Thus, for the executive
order as a whole, species that do not cause harm or offer benefits that outweigh their
harms may be exempt.
The third prong of the federal approach to nonnative species, the National
Invasive Species Act (“NISA”), applies only to aquatic nuisance species (“ANS”),
defined by NISA as the “nonindigenous species that threaten[] the diversity or
abundance of native species or the ecological stability of infested waters, or
commercial, agricultural, aquacultural or recreational activities dependent on such
waters.”130 NISA does not directly address established populations of species, but
largely focuses on ballast water issues, and thus does not address the guest species
issue. Other federal acts address individual invasive species or groups of species,
but these are directed at species broadly considered harmful (e.g. brown tree snake),
and so do not address guest species.131
States generally take the lead role in most wildlife management, and many state
level laws reflect this same willingness to focus on the more harmful species.
Although state level definitions may differ in subtle ways from the federal definition
of invasive species,132 some states directly draw on the definition from E.O.
13112.133 Florida and Hawaii, the two states most plagued by nonnative species, both
define their nonnative species of concern along the same lines as the order. The
127
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Florida Invasive Species Partnership defines “invasive species” as “[a]ny
species . . . that is not native to an ecosystem; and whose introduction does or is
likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human health.”134 The
Statewide Invasive Species Strategic Plan for Florida defines “invasive species” as
“a nonindigenous species that has the ability to establish self-sustaining, expanding,
free-living populations, and may cause economic and/or environmental harm.”135
Hawaii lacks an official designation of invasive species, and the Hawaii
Invasive Species Council (“HISC”) is currently working on drafting and adopting
administrative rules to formally define species that are invasive in Hawaii.136
Nevertheless, the HISC suggests that the term typically includes only those species
that are both “harmful to the environment, economy, and/or human health,” and “not
native to Hawaii (i.e., species that were introduced by human assistance rather than
by their own means of introduction).”137 In California, the Invasive Species Council
defines invasive species as “non-native organisms which cause economic or
environmental harm,”138 directly and explicitly paralleling the federal executive
order. California statutes similarly define invasive pests as organisms whose
introduction into California “would or would likely cause economic or
environmental harm.”139 California Fish and Game Code—which offers a black list
of banned species—leaves out California’s prominent guest species, including
striped bass, largemouth and smallmouth bass, northern pike, and brown trout.140
These examples seem to be the norm among states,141 but more research is needed
in this area.142
This tendency toward excluding more benign nonnative species from regulation
may reflect the underlying scientific literature. Scientific sources are more divided,
134
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but they often reiterate the idea that a nonnative species should be treated as an
invasive species only when the species is causing a negative impact. For example,
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”) defined invasive
species as “animals, plants or other organisms introduced by man into places out of
their natural range of distribution, where they become established and disperse,
generating a negative impact on the local ecosystem and species.”143
This tendency toward excluding more benign nonnative species from regulation
could, perhaps, solve the guest species issue. Because guest species include only
those species we actively conserve, guest species tend to be species we think of as
beneficial or as having a minimal or acceptable impact on their new ecosystems. But
this apparent exclusion of guest species from regulation falls apart under close
scrutiny. Nearly any species added to an ecosystem has some impact on that
ecosystem. I found no instance of a nonnative species that naturalized without
impacting at least one other organism in a negative way.144
Species interact negatively in one of three broad ways: predation, parasitism,
and competition.145As discussed below,146 the degree of impact on other species
varies tremendously, but even the relatively “good” guests, like striped bass or
pheasant, have some impacts on the native ecosystem. The impacts may be no more
significant than those from individual native species, or native species may rapidly
adjust to the new species and thus avoid most impacts. But under the language of
the invasive species definitions, these impacts would be enough to qualify the guests
as invasive and thus make them qualify for regulation under these acts. And, perhaps
more importantly, even these minimal impacts subject guest species to regulation
under other federal laws, including both NEPA and the ESA.
NEPA requires analysis of environmental risks associated with major federal
actions, including actions that may impact nonnative species, and thus gives
agencies the authority to consider nonnative species in their decisionmaking.147
NEPA analysis plays a significant role in the third case study, discussed below.148
The ESA protects both species listed as threatened or endangered and the
ecosystems on which they depend.149 The ESA’s primary protections show up in
Section 7, regulating federal actions, and Section 9, regulating actions by all entities.
Section 7 of the ESA places requirements on federal agencies contemplating actions
(either directly or via permitting decisions) that may impact listed species or their
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habitat.150 The agency contemplating an action must work with the agency charged
with protecting the listed species in order to ensure that the proposed action will not
jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species and to get permission to
incidentally impact listed species.151 ESA Section 9 prohibits the “take” of any listed
species by anyone absent a permit.152 This take prohibition is broad and addresses
both direct take and indirect take through habitat modification. Both sections
implicate guest species and provide some authority for agency actions to address
nonnatives generally. The Act does not offer de minimus exceptions, so any impact
from a nonnative species, even a small impact, subjects the species to the Act.153 The
application of both the ESA and NEPA to guest species is addressed in more detail
in the case studies presented below154 and has resulted in significant litigation and
policy disputes concerning guest species.155
Treatment of nonnative species also varies on different types of federal land,
and some have argued that states continue to have the power to introduce or
otherwise manage nonnative game species on federal lands, including the Bureau of
Land Management (“BLM”), Forest Service, and wilderness lands,156 although the
BLM manual states that the “the BLM will remove, to the extent practicable and
permitted by Federal law, any non-native fish or wildlife species from [Wilderness
Study Areas].”157 As other commentators note, use of the concept of native by federal
land management agencies for management decisions is problematic: “[the] term
‘native’ is itself in question because . . . the federal land management agencies lack
[explicit] statutory authorization to regulate on this basis. Not only do the organic
and enabling acts of these agencies fail to define ‘native,’ these Acts neither
reference the term nor any concept commonly associated therewith.”158 Treatment
of nonnative species on federal lands merits additional study, as the limits of federal
authority in this area remain unclear.159
150
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To summarize the legal landscape, most state and federal efforts to address
nonnative species appear to give guest species a pass at first glance, either because
the policies do not address established populations or because they attempt to focus
on the most harmful species. But nearly all of these species do have some negative
impacts, and these impacts subject guest species to regulation under these and other
state and federal laws. This dissonant treatment of guest species leads to significant
legal and policy conflicts.
Conflicts over guest species also seem to be particularly hard fought and long
lasting conflicts. This results from several aspects unique to guest species. First,
guest species raise federalism concerns based on the conflict between the states’
traditional role as the lead entities for wildlife management and the federal
environmental protection aimed at broader conservation goals. State decisions that
are subject to federal oversight, either through NEPA processes, ESA take
prohibitions, or other federal legislation, can become flash points for litigation or
extrajudicial solutions via legislation. Second, at least some members of the public
have an interest in maintaining wild populations of these species, and they tend to
expend significant resources to protect their interests when traditional
environmentalists would prefer to control or eliminate the guest species. These
resource-backed conflicts may lead to lawsuits or drag out policy disputes. This
contrasts with the typical invasive species situation, where the conflict is not over
removal of the invasive species, but rather over the method or possibility of success.
Third, guest species often play important roles in novel or heavily impacted
ecosystems where native species may have trouble persisting. In heavily impacted
or intentionally modified systems, we have often inherently made the choice not to
value native species, and guest species often thrive in the modified ecosystem. This
magnifies any inherent conflicts between guest species and negative species and
may make the guest species targets of environmental groups. The three case studies
presented below—goats and sheep in Hawaii, the striped bass in the California
Delta, and the rainbow and brown trout below the Flaming Gorge Dam in Utah—
illustrate these aspects of the guest species concept and the conflicts that guest
species create.
D. Case Study One: The Palila and the Hungry Goats
The palila story dates to the late eighteenth century, when Captain Vancouver,
an officer in the Royal Navy, introduced sheep and goats to the island of Hawaii.160
The sheep and goats prospered on the island, eventually escaping captivity and
making a naturalized home in the Hawaiian forests.161 The wild sheep population
grew as high as an estimated 40,000 sheep in 1936,162 and the large sheep and goat
populations overwhelmed the native forest. The sheep and goats thrived in the native
160
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māmane forest on the slopes of Mauna Kea, but the sheep and goats ate māmane
seedlings, preventing regeneration of the māmane trees, and ate the leaves and stems
of adult trees, weakening them.163 The overpopulation destroyed the māmane
forests, so the local government began population control measures for the sheep in
1921. Over 61,000 sheep were killed by 1946.164 The goat population never grew
quite as large, although they also had significant impacts on the forest.165
In 1950, the state (then territory) shifted from their unsuccessful program of
eradication to managing the sheep and goats as game animals for hunting, aiming to
maintain the sheep population between 1,000–3,000 and the goat population under
1,000.166 The state managed the population by allowing limited public hunting of the
sheep, with additional hunting allowed whenever population levels grew.167 The
sheep and goats supported a robust hunting trade, with many tourist hunters coming
to Hawaii to hunt the goats and sheep.168 The Hawaii State Division of Fish and
Game added a closely related species, the European mouflon,169 between 1962–1966
to improve the characteristics of the feral sheep herd, but the mouflon became a
popular game animal in their own right and has naturalized as well.170
Although the introduced sheep and goats have prospered, they have caused
significant impacts on native Hawaiian species. The sheep and goats live primarily
in a State Game Management Area on Mauna Kea, which includes much of the
remaining māmane forests on the island of Hawaii.171 These forests comprise critical
habitat for the palila, a beautiful small Hawaiian honeycreeper bird that feeds almost
exclusively on the māmane trees.172 Because of the destruction of the māmane by
the large sheep and goat herds, the palila are restricted to about 10% of their
historical range.173 The palila were listed under the federal ESA in 1967 under a prior
version of the act, and as of the late 1970s when this dispute began, fewer than 2,000
of the birds survived in the wild.174
In 1979, the Sierra Club and several other environmental groups filed suit
against the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources (“DLNR”), alleging
that the DLNR’s management of feral goat and sheep herds amounted to a taking of
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the palila under the ESA.175 As of the lawsuit’s filing, the goat population in the
palila’s critical habitat ranged between 200–300, while the sheep population hovered
around 600.176 The “management” at issue in the suit consisted of limiting public
hunting of the wild goats and sheep, but not active habitat improvement, breeding,
or other positive management of the species.177 The environmental groups sued on
the theory that prohibiting hunting of the wild goats and sheep resulted in increased
consumption of māmane trees, which in turn reduced the number of trees, and which
resulted in less habitat available for the palila.178 The ESA prohibits unpermitted
taking of listed species.179 The Act defines “take” as “harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct.”180 By regulation, the relevant agencies defined harm to mean “an act
which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such [an] act may include significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or
sheltering.”181 Based on this broad definition, the trial court (rather summarily)
concluded that the state’s actions violated the Act’s take prohibition and ordered the
state to kill or otherwise remove the sheep and goats,182 kicking off a long series of
appeals and subsequent litigation.
The DLNR appealed the 1979 decision to the Ninth Circuit, substantively
arguing that their actions did not amount to a taking under the Act.183 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed in Palila II, concluding “[t]he state violated the Endangered Species
Act by maintaining feral sheep and goats in the Palila’s habitat.”184 In 1984, the
Sierra Club amended its original complaint to allege the DLNR’s maintenance of
mouflon sheep in the palila habitat also amounted to a taking under the Act, and two
years later the same district court applied the reasoning from Palila I and issued a
decision (Palila III) extending the removal order beyond the original feral goats and
sheep to include the mouflon.185
In the interim, the Sportsmen of Hawaii and several other hunting groups
intervened to argue for the preservation of the goat and sheep herds.186 The DLNR
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and the intervenors appealed, and the Ninth Circuit again affirmed,187 holding that
the district court’s interpretation of taking and harm under the Act, coupled with its
findings concerning mouflon and habitat destruction, were “enough to sustain an
order for the removal of the mouflon sheep.”188 The district court reaffirmed its order
in 1999, over the objection of the intervening hunting groups and the DLNR, which
argued the order should be changed because total sheep removal was proving too
difficult.189 By that point, many of the animals had already been removed through a
combination of DLNR “staff hunting, unrestricted public hunting, and fencing. The
staff hunting included contracted hunting by helicopter.”190 As of September 22,
1998, at least 180 sheep, sheep hybrids, or mouflon remained within the critical
habitat, although the goats were apparently eliminated.191 The court noted
considerable regrowth of the māmane and other native plants, with commensurate
improvement in the palila’s critical habitat.192 Finally, in 2013, the district court
again reaffirmed its decision,193 this last time in response to DLNR’s motion seeking
reassurance that it could not be prosecuted under a provision of Hawaiian law
barring “any person [from engaging] in the eradication of any animal for any reason
while being transported by helicopter, airplane, or any other similar means,”194
passed in response to the lawsuit.195
By the end of 2011, approximately 18,130 sheep and 310 goats had been killed
since 1979, which, combined with the 61,000 sheep killed prior to 1960, gives a total
of over 79,000 sheep removed for habitat improvement.196 Nevertheless, the sheep
population appears to be increasing and has been doing so since at least 1999,197
indicating that reproduction and immigration to the critical habitat area has
outstripped control efforts.198 Current estimates put the sheep population in the
critical habitat at 10,000–14,000 sheep,199 and they continue to significantly damage
the palila habitat.200 Fencing the critical habitat to prevent additional immigration of
sheep and goats is continuing due to significant federal funding awards around
187
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2014.201 The exclosures, plus increased efforts to exterminate the goats, may reverse
the decline of the māmane forests, although palila numbers have fallen drastically
over the last five years due to ongoing drought in Hawaii.202 Other threats to the
palila include introduced predators, particularly feral cats, “which depredate
approximately 11% of palila nests annually.” 203 Ongoing control efforts removed
168 feral cats between 2009–2012.204 New herbivores have also been introduced, in
particular the axis deer “recently smuggled onto Hawai’i Island from Maui in
exchange for mouflon sheep,”205 which has the potential to be as much of a threat as
the goats and sheep have been.206
This series of cases raises myriad issues, from baseline questions—Is the
baseline unregulated hunting of sheep and goats by the public? Or is the normal state
of affairs no hunting, with explicit permission required for a public hunt—to
causation issues—Is this causal chain just too long for a true ESA take, as suggested
by Justice O’Connor?207—and many commentators ably address these issues.208
From the guest species perspective, the two most interesting aspects of the case are
the federalism challenges in the federal oversight of a traditional state role and the
district court’s unusual removal remedy, neither of which have received much
scholarly interest.
1. Lesson: Federal Oversight of State Wildlife Management Breeds Conflict
The Palila cases highlight conflict between state wildlife management and
federal oversight. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[u]nquestionably the States
have broad trustee and police powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions.”209
Congress also recognizes this traditional authority.210 At its core, the states’
responsibility for game management is a part of its public trust responsibilities, and
thus the states cannot abdicate this responsibility nor surrender it to the federal
government.211 This aspect of American wildlife management—dispersed authority
among the several states—is “[o]ne of the greatest contrasts between the English
201
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and American systems of wildlife management [and] . . . led to the explosion of both
opportunity and exploitation in America, thus causing an overharvesting of
species—many to scarcity, and some even to extinction.”212 This overharvesting and
decline in game species led, in large part, to the birth of the early conservation
movement and inspired many of the movements early leaders.213 These early efforts
birthed modern wildlife management in the United States, known as the North
American Model of Wildlife Conservation (the “Model”).214
The Model relies on seven “pillars,” which focus on management of wildlife as
a public trust resource, treating wildlife as an international resource, embracing
science based wildlife policy, and maintaining the democracy of hunting through
broad access and participation.215 This model led hunters and hunting organizations
to become a strong early voice for conservation. Indeed, many of the earliest
National Parks were created to preserve game animals,216 and lobbying by hunting
organizations led to federal legislation like the Lacey Act, the Duck Stamp Act of
1934, the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937,217 and even international
treaties like the Migratory Bird Treaty.218 Hunters contribute over $1.6 billion
annually to conservation at the state, local, and federal level,219 and remain a strong
lobby both for wildlife protection and for hunting opportunities.
Based on this history, most game management occurs at the state level, based
initially on the longstanding tradition of state ownership of wildlife220 and then on
the state police powers and the public trust doctrine.221 This tradition of state level
management of wildlife was in place by the late 1800s, when states had begun to
“regulate the use of fishing grounds, restrict hunting by seasons or outright
prohibitions, and terminate certain commerce in wildlife altogether.”222 Federal law
212
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generally respects this separation. For example, “the BLM and Forest Service are
statutorily limited from ‘diminishing the responsibility and authority of the States
for management of fish and resident wildlife’ as that authority existed in 1976.”223
State interest, however, tends to focus on species of economic importance, leaving
out most nongame and plant species.224 This tendency likely stems, at least in part,
from the funding sources for state agencies that regulate such things, which
traditionally drew their funding almost entirely from “taxes and fees on hunters and
fishers, who consequently had great influence”225 under the model. As a result,
States have traditionally played a significant role in managing wildlife, but
play a very small role in implementing the Endangered Species Act, and
an even smaller role with other federal wildlife statutes . . . . While states
and local governments are best positioned to manage local habitat, federal
oversight is needed to ensure that our widely shared benefits (biodiversity)
are not lost to a tragedy of the commons problem.226
As a result, “[c]ontrol over wildlife has evolved separately at the state and national
levels, nearly to the point of each operating in a vacuum. It is no surprise, then, that
we see substantial regulatory overlap and little cooperation.”227 As the Supreme
Court has noted, state authority to regulate wildlife “exist[s] only ‘in so far as (their)
exercise may be not incompatible with, or restrained by, the rights conveyed to the
Federal government by the Constitution,’”228 which includes the protection of public
lands and the exercise of federal authority though legislation like the ESA.
With this background, the conflict between state interests in wildlife
management and the federal efforts to remove some guest species appears inevitable.
At a foundational level, state efforts seek to maximize hunting availability
(democratizing hunting), and much of the state and federal conservation and
management apparatus is designed around this endpoint. When federal efforts to
protect nongame species become incompatible with management of a game species,
conflict cannot be avoided. This is a recognized phenomenon, even at the
international level. “At present, numerous national and international regimes have
developed a variety of terms and descriptions to identify and define an assortment
of unwanted species. Yet . . . even when regimes provide broad definitions of
[invasive species], states are reluctant to adopt these definitions if the species is
considered a useful resource.”229
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This dynamic is apparent in the Palila fight. In spite of Hawaii’s long term
effort to comply with the court’s removal order, it nevertheless placed some limits
on public hunting in order to accommodate hunting interests. “To accommodate
devotees of archery, handguns, and muzzleloaders, a large area of palila core
habitat . . . continued to be reserved for their exclusive use during most—but not
all—of the eradication program . . . .”230 These forms of hunting—particularly
archery and handguns—are hunting methods with very low harvest rates, compared
to high powered rifles or helicopter hunting.231 This difficulty has been apparent as
far back as 1976: “The only solution for preventing further injury to the vegetation
is to substantially reduce or totally remove all feral sheep from Mauna Kea. The
primary difficulty with this plan of action is hunter opposition.”232 The opposition
appears both in direct action (twenty three instances of vandalism to goat and sheep
exclosure fences over a sixteen month period),233 local legislation banning aerial
shooting,234 and in legal actions (for example, the continued intervention in the
lawsuit against Hawaii by hunting groups).235 Federal intrusion into this traditional
state domain, particularly when the state and the federal government are operating
under conflicting mandates, results in serious conflicts over guest species.
Sheep removal efforts have succeeded in other island contexts, on smaller
islands where reinvasion can be controlled,236 but settings like this, where dedicated
local groups seek to preserve guest species and the state appears to be complicit in
their efforts, are much more difficult. Even in this case, where the sheep and goats
are undeniably pushing a listed species to extinction, such conflict has made removal
controversial and logistically challenging when state and federal governments work
at cross purposes in controlling guest species, eradication is difficult or impossible.
2. Lesson: Current Remedies are Inadequate to Address Guest Species
The district court’s remedy in this case directly implicates the way we think
about guest species. The court ordered the state to remedy its take violation not by
ceasing to manage the goat and sheep populations, which would be the natural
remedy for a violation based on this management, but rather that the state go out and
actively kill the nonnative species at issue.
The court ordered removal of the guest species first by July 31, 1981,237 then
again by January 27, 1988,238 and then the parties finally agreed on a stipulated order
requiring removal efforts on an ongoing basis “for so long as the court’s judgment
230
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and orders . . . are still in full force and effect.”239 This is remarkable. It would be
one thing if the court had ordered the state to stop actively protecting the sheep and
goats—to remove any season restrictions, to stop any stocking of the animals, or
even to facilitate hunting by the public. But this remedy goes much further.
As both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit determined, managing the goat
population for hunting purposes amounted to a taking under the ESA.240 When the
court required the state to actively hunt and kill the populations, the court moved far
beyond the mandates of the ESA, and its remedy raises concerns about future cases
targeting native species management.
ESA itself draws no distinction between native and nonnative species,241 and
the court, both for the finding of a taking and for the remedy itself, would apply
equally strongly in cases concerning a native species that either directly killed any
listed species or indirectly harmed it through habitat modification. Consider the
federally endangered California least tern, a bird species nesting in coastal areas in
California.242 Many native species prey on these terns, including crows, coyotes,
kestrels, loggerhead shrikes, ravens, ground squirrels, harrier hawks, burrowing owl,
raccoons, and striped skunk.243 Many of these species are protected, in part, by
federal or state laws, including general bans on hunting by the public (for harrier
hawks and burrowing owls, for example) or by restrictive state laws limiting the
method and timing of hunting (e.g. crows, doves).244 Do these laws amount to a
taking under the ESA? And if they do, would the likely remedy involve requiring
states to reduce or eliminate populations of these native species?
Indeed, for some colonies of nesting terns, the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and Animal Damage Control has
undertaken reductions in the populations of these potential predators.245 But there is
a world of difference between an agency selectively removing some predators and a
court ordered removal of a species. In at least one case, “peregrine falcons (falco
peregrines), an endangered species themselves, were observed frequenting the area
of several tern colonies and are suspected of preying on adult California least
tern.”246 And the removals themselves have spurred lawsuits by local animal rights
groups to protect the nonnative red fox.247 Even limited to guest species, this
reasoning would allow a court to require every state in the nation to remove all
239
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nonnative largemouth bass, or pheasant, or grasses, or earthworms. This would be
both impossible248 and shortsighted.
The court erred by ordering removal. Removal as a remedy presumes a degree
of control over ecosystems that we simply cannot exercise, and the decision to
require removal harkens back to the false dichotomy between human and natural.
Courts have not targeted native species for removal in lawsuits like these, despite
the lack of a legal basis to distinguish the guest species from native species.
Although removal of the sheep and goats would be an ideal solution to this
controversy, the courts are not the ideal venue for resolving these difficult resource
management issues. The palila lawsuit, particularly its remedy, creates a potential
firestorm of litigation that could involve species management decisions in states
across the nation. And even if the Palila court had not ordered removal but only a
cessation of any limitations on hunting, the core problem of goats in the palila habitat
would not be resolved. Adequately addressing this problem requires a broader effort,
and any effort would have to consider the social aspects of the problem created by
the hunters.
The primary option allowed by the ESA to avoid illegal take is a
Section 10(a)(1)(B) permit, which can permit “any taking otherwise prohibited
by [the Act] if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out
of an otherwise lawful activity.”249 The permit requires submission of an extensive
habitat conservation plan, including public comment and National Environmental
Policy Act compliance.250 This might offer a path to address ESA concerns around
guest species were it not for the ubiquity of these species. Completing the permitting
requirements for all guest species that a state or local government manages in any
way, even through actions as innocuous as prohibiting public harvest of the species,
would impose huge costs on state and local governments and tie up the overburdened
agencies responsible for administering the ESA for decades to come.251
In short, neither the courts nor current federal law adequately addresses our
complex relationship with guest species.

248
Arian D. Wallach et al., Novel Trophic Cascades: Apex Predators Enable
Coexistence, 30 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 146, 146 (2015) (“[M]ost introduced
species cannot realistically be eradicated.”).
249
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2012).
250
Anne B. Hulick, Habitat Conservation Plans: Protecting Species, Enhancing
Democratic Legitimacy and Promoting Stewardship Are Not Mutually Exclusive Goals, 25
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 441, 448 (2006).
251
ALICIA OLLER ET AL., TETRA TECH, LESSONS LEARNED FROM HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANS: APPLICATIONS FOR WIND AND ENDANGERED SPECIES 1,
https://www.nationalwind.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/research_meetings/Research_
Meeting_VIII_Oller.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UE6-XBM4] (reporting completion times of 1–
14 years and costs of $10,000 to $9,000,000 for habitat conservation plans to permit take
from wind energy projects).

200

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

E. Case Study Two: The Salmon and the Striped Bass
Striped bass are an anadromous (spawn in fresh water but mature in estuaries
or the ocean) species native to the U.S. East Coast.252 They are renowned both as a
sports fish and as table fare, and so were introduced in California in 1870 by
Livingston Stone at the suggestion of the California State Board of Fish
Commissioners.253 Less than thirty years later, in 1899, the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries
reported a commercial catch in California of 1.234 million pounds.254 The striped
bass population reached roughly 3 million adult fish by the early 1960s.255 As of
2008, estimates placed the population at roughly one million adult fish.256 These fish
are the primary target of California anglers, with more than 81% of anglers in the
northern thirty one counties in California reporting that they had fished for striped
bass over a two-year period,257 spending on average $146.91 per day.258 “In 2009
Bay Delta Complex anglers created more than 6,600 jobs, almost $270 million labor
income, and almost $.5 billion output in the 31 counties in the Bay Delta
Complex”;259 these numbers are not broken out by species, but given that more than
81% of these anglers fish for striped bass, striped bass have a significant economic
impact in California. Estimates specific to striped bass value the fishery at $28.7
million per year in the regional economy, with an economic impact per fish caught
of roughly $500.260 “In 2000, CDFG obtained from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) separate
incidental take permits under the ESA for the Striped Bass Management
Program . . . . CDFG halted its striped bass stocking program in 2002 and the
program has not been reinitiated.”261 Absent stocking, the population is expected to
decline to roughly 515,000 adults in the long term.262
The U.S. Congress recognized the significance of the striped bass fishery in
California in the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (“CVPIA”),263 which
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“contains numerous provisions calling for protection and enhancement of striped
bass within the Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta.” 264 The CVPIA states that the
Secretary of the Interior must:
[D]evelop within three years of enactment . . . a program which makes all
reasonable efforts to ensure that, by the year 2002, natural production of
anadromous fish[es] [including striped bass] in Central Valley rivers and
streams will be sustainable, on a long-term basis, at levels not less than
twice the average levels attained during the period of 1967–1991 . . . .265
The U.S. FWS established a goal of 2.5 million fish to fulfill their obligations under
the CVPIA. The Secretary must, “if requested by the State of California, assist in
developing and implementing management measures to restore the striped bass
fishery of the Bay–Delta estuary.”266
In 2008, the Coalition for a Sustainable Delta267 filed suit against the Executive
Director of the California Fish and Game Commission, which sets fish and game
regulatory policy in California, and members of the California Department of Fish
and Game (“CDFG”), which enforces the regulations,268 alleging “the Commission’s
promulgation and CDFG’s maintenance and enforcement of striped bass fishing
regulations cause the unlawful ‘take’ of four species of ESA ‘listed’ fish.”269 At the
time of the suit, California’s striped bass regulations allowed anglers to keep two
striped bass eighteen inches long or longer and no striped bass shorter than eighteen
inches.270
The Coalition’s theory of the case is that: “[t]hrough the adoption and
enforcement of the striped bass fishing regulations, which include bag and size
limitations . . . the Commission and CDFG have allowed and encouraged the
population of the non-native striped bass to thrive in the Delta.”271 In turn, “the
striped bass prey upon and consume the [l]isted [s]pecies, and this is one of several
causes of the population declines of the [l]isted [s]pecies.”272 This mirrors the theory
in the palila cases, albeit one step closer in the causal chain.273 Note that at the
264
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judgment on the pleadings stage, the court barred suit against the Executive Director
of the California Fish and Game Commission based on both Eleventh Amendment
immunity and legislative immunity;274 this became significant later in the case.
CDFG also argued that the CVPIA preempted the lawsuit by implicitly exempting
the striped bass programs from the ESA.275
In response to a 2010 motion for summary judgment, the court addressed the
form of take alleged by the Coalition.276 The court considered both an approach that
would treat the take as “acts of a third party that indirectly bring about a take by
causing another to effect a take,” a form of vicarious liability, and an approach that
would treat the take as a harm due to habitat modification, because the human
manipulation by increasing the predator population in effect modified the listed
species habitat.277 The court ultimately concluded that vicarious liability could not
apply, because it relied on some entity at some point actually taking a listed species
in violation of the Act, and the court found that “[a] fish cannot ‘take’ another fish
under the ESA, because only a ‘person’ can violate the ESA’s take prohibition.”278
This left the plaintiffs with a theory of take relying on habitat modification. The
distinction matters here because, under the habitat modification theory, “harm by
habitat modification requires proof of a population level effect,”279 not merely proof
that an individual of a listed species would be taken. Under this higher standard of
proof, the Coalition’s several motions for a pretrial decision failed. Due to the
muddled food web relationships and ecosystem wide issues in the Delta, the
Coalition could not adequately show that striped bass had a net negative population
level effect on listed species.
This problem plagued the Coalition throughout the suit. For example, during
early pretrial litigation, the court found the Coalition lacked standing to sue based
on a failure to show redressability:
[E]ven if it were to prevail in this case, its injury would not necessarily be
redressed. If the regulations were invalidated, even if the striped bass
population were reduced to a level that measurably protected salmonid
species on which they prey, there are other predators (the pikeminnow)
and other causes: operation of the Projects, toxics, in-Delta diverters, alien
invasive species, all of which contribute to the species’ jeopardy. The
present Delta smelt and salmonids jeopardy findings are based on drought
conditions and Project operations, as primary causes. The extent to which
1979). Here, the Commission and the CDFG regulate the catch of striped bass, which
increases (or prevents a decrease in) the number of striped bass, which directly take the listed
species via predation. Carlson, 2008 WL 2899725 at *1.
274
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275
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276
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all other cooperative causes will continue to operate is unknown. There
remains total uncertainty whether reduction in the threat of some predators
will have more than minimal effect on the protected species.280
Throughout the pretrial litigation, the court raised a host of other scientific issues
around the impacts of reducing the striped bass population, some of which merit
discussion as real-life examples of the difficulty in assigning cause and effect
relationships in a functioning ecosystem.
At a minimum, the court notes, “striped bass predation results in mortality of at
least 5% of the listed salmonid populations each year . . . . However, this is not
equivalent to a finding that the invalidation of the striped bass sportfishing
regulations would similarly increase listed salmonid mortality by any measurable
quantity.”281 Why wouldn’t elimination of the striped bass result in at least a 5%
improvement in listed species survival? Striped bass are opportunistic predators,
eating whatever species they can fit in their mouths.282 They prey on many other
predators of listed species, including largemouth bass and catfish, and even on their
own young.283 Removing this top predator would likely increase the abundance of
the other predators, with unknown impacts on the salmon population. Although the
striped bass also eat delta smelt on rare occasions,284 reducing the striped bass
population also may not result in a net reduction in delta smelt consumption by all
predators for several reasons. For example, the striped bass is a primary predator on
the introduced Mississippi silverside, which is itself a primary predator on (and
competitor with) the delta smelt.285 Thus, decreased striped bass abundance could
lead to an increase in silversides and a concomitant decrease in delta smelt. Further,
in a phenomenon known as compensatory predation, reduced predation on one life
stage of a species is sometimes offset by additional predation at other life stages,
resulting in no net change to the population.286 Decreased predation on salmonids at
early life stages by striped bass could result in increased predation by marine
mammals in the ocean, for example. Moreover, predation often focuses on hatchery
salmonids, which are poorly adapted to life in the wild and are much less likely to
survive to reproduce than their wild counterparts.287
Taken together, these effects (striped bass predation on other
predators/competitors, compensatory predation, and predation on individuals
280
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unlikely to reproduce) make it very difficult to document any positive impacts from
predator control efforts. In the Pacific Northwest, for example, the native northern
pikeminnow consumes roughly eight percent of the salmon and steelhead
population, and since 1991, the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission and the
U.S. Department of Energy have funded a control program to reward anglers who
catch and kill the pikeminnow.288 By the start of 2015, anglers participating in the
program eliminated 4.1 million native pikeminnows,289 with no discernable impact
on the salmon population.290 And, notably, California striped bass in some areas prey
as frequently on pikeminnow as they do on salmon or steelhead.291
Beyond the convoluted food web relationships, population level data related to
this population of striped bass does not support the Coalitions causal argument. The
court noted that listed species are rare in the striped bass diet,292 and found that
“available historical information on population trends does not suggest that high
periods in striped bass abundance coincided with lower populations of salmon as
would be expected if striped bass were a major factor limiting salmon abundance.”293
Indeed, regression analysis looking for relationships between striped bass abundance
and those of the listed species showed a positive relationship between striped bass
abundance and winter-run salmon abundance,294 not a negative relationship,
suggesting that the salmon do well when striped bass do well. The analysis showed
288
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“no relationship between striped bass abundance and either spring run, or delta smelt
abundance.”295 Even at the most optimistic outcome, total removal of all stripers
from the Delta would increase “winter-run [Chinook salmon] recovery probabilities
by slightly more than three percent and . . . the winter run would still have about a
one in five chance of extinction in the next 50 years.”296
Due in large part to these uncertainties, in February 2011, the parties came to a
settlement agreement.297 As a result of the agreement, the court never had to rule on
the CVPIA preemption argument, noting only that “the evidence suggests it is
possible, but not certain, that enforcement of the ESA in this case can be harmonized
with implementation of the CVPIA.”298 The settlement agreement required
defendants to prepare a recommendation for the Commission, “based upon the best
available scientific information to modify the striped bass sport fishing regulation to
reduce striped bass predation on the listed species.”299 The court could not compel
the Commission to accept the proposal due to the Commission’s aforementioned
immunity to suit.300 Per the agreement, the defendants developed the proposal in
collaboration with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration National Marine Fisheries Service, and CDFG
submitted the proposal to the Commission.301 The Commission considered the
proposal, and, in February 2012, unanimously rejected it.302 Pursuant to the
settlement agreement, the court dismissed the Coalition’s suit with prejudice.303 No
parties to the suit have taken significant actions since the Commission’s decision,
and the future of this dispute is unclear.
As noted, California once held a Section 10(a)(1)(B) permit under the ESA,
which would have permitted them to take some actions with respect to the striped
bass populations without violating the take restrictions in the ESA.304 Specifically,
California sought permitting for:
(1) annual stocking of 1- and 2-year-old striped bass in the San Francisco
Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Estuary at numbers sufficient to restore and
295
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maintain a striped bass population of 712,000 adults . . . ; (2) possible
changes in the striped bass fishing regulations to help reach and maintain
the target population level; and (3) monitoring of the overall striped bass
population . . . .305
This population level would still have fallen short of the CVPIA requirements.306
The stocking program allowed under the Section 10(a)(1)(B) permit ceased after two
years in 2001, when striper populations hit the maximum levels allowed under the
permit.307 California has not publicized any plans to renew the permit.
At this point, the fishing regulations remain in effect and the case had been
dismissed, but the state does not have any ESA permitting for the striped bass
management.
1. Lesson: People Love Their Guest Species; This Increases Conflicts
Like the Palila cases, this case highlights the conflict between state wildlife
management goals (maintenance or improvement of the striped bass fishery) and
federal ESA enforcement, but this case also highlights the role that a dedicated
constituency can play in resource protection. The striped bass lobby in California
includes the Sportfishing Conservancy, the California Sportfishing League, the
Coastside Fishing Club, the California Striped Bass Association, and the California
Sportfishing Protection Alliance, among many, many others.308 These organizations
represent a large number of individuals with a strong interest in maintaining a striped
bass fishery in California, with a long history of political activism to achieve their
goals. For example, the California legislature banned commercial fishing for striped
bass in 1935 as a result of strong lobbying by recreational anglers.309 The CVPIA’s
inclusion of striped bass in its doubling goal for fish populations stands as another
example of concerted effort by local groups to protect their guest species fishery.
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The striped bass lobby also created a Striped Bass Stamp,310 a way to tax themselves
in order to increase striped bass populations via stocking.311 Recognizing even then
the potential for conflicts over striped bass, the groups ensured that 15% of the
striped bass stamp fee went for salmon conservation.312
In some ways, even this lawsuit itself is a testament to the power of the striped
bass lobby. The CVPIA cannot achieve the striped bass doubling goal without
significant influxes of additional water, far beyond what agricultural groups would
be likely to consider reasonable.313 This lawsuit, then, appears to be an effort to cut
the striped bass lobby off from other environmental groups more interested in
conserving listed species (e.g. CalTrout, Trout Unlimited, the NRDC, and other
conservation-oriented groups) and to hamstring their efforts to get more water.
Although the plaintiff claims they are protecting salmonids, plaintiff Coalition for a
Sustainable Delta is “a coalition of agricultural water users in the San Joaquin Valley
that contract for State Water Project (“SWP”) water deliveries from the Delta,”314
hardly the first group that comes to mind when thinking about salmon protection.
Finally, a subsection of this striped bass community rallied around the effort to
convince the Commission to reject the proposed rule limiting protection for striped
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Therefore, defendants’ ESA violations threaten deliveries of SWP water to
members of the [Coalition].
Complaint at ¶ 40, Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. Carlson, No. 1:08-CV-00397 OWW GSA
(E.D. Cal. 2008).
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bass,315 providing the Commission with a strong incentive to nix the proposal.316
Dedicated local or statewide groups make for more intense controversies and may
lack significant opposition at the state level.317
These controversies spurred in part by interest groups seeking to protect guest
species are not limited to game species. As noted above, other groups have filed
lawsuits protecting nonnative species, including red foxes preying on endangered
terns.318 Moreover, groups and dedicated individuals319 devoted to the protection of
nonnative species have managed to pass federal law protecting some guest species.
For instance, “[t]he Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act . . . was enacted in
1971 to protect ‘all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of
the United States,’ . . . from ‘capture, branding, harassment, or death.’”320 The Act
required the responsible land management agencies “to protect and manage [the
animals] as components of the public lands . . . in a manner that is designed to
achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands.”321
The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act labels the horses and burros “an
integral part of the natural system of the public lands.”322 As the Supreme Court
noted, “[a]ccording to Congress, these animals, if preserved in their native habitats,
‘contribute to the diversity of life forms within the Nation and enrich the lives of the
American people.’”323 Of course, in spite of the Supreme Court’s view, the horses
315

A coalition of sportfishing and outdoor recreation organizations opposing the
petition include: California Sportfishing League, American Sportfishing Association, CCACal, Coastside Fishing Club, Congressional Sportfishing Foundation, Water4Fishing.org,
Fishing League Worldwide, Bass Conservation and the National Marine Manufacturing
Association. Mark Lassange, Controversial Striped Bass and Black Bass Petition
Withdrawn, BASS ANGLER MAG. (Aug. 23, 2016), http://bassanglermag.com/controversialstriped-bass-and-black-bass-petition-withdrawn/ [https://perma.cc/25VX-WUJD].
316
See Tom Martens, Is it Bye Bye Bass in Delta?, DAVIS ENTERPRISE (Dec. 14, 2011),
http://www.davisenterprise.com/sports/sports-columns/is-it-bye-bye-bass-in-delta/
[https://perma.cc/GZG7-KC2Y].
317
See A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its
Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 558 (1993) (observing that “[t]o further complicate the
problem, local controversies are more intense and less subject to countervailing forces.”).
318
See Butchko, supra note 242, at 238.
319
Velma B. Johnston, also known as Wild Horse Annie, led the charge for the Freeroaming Horses and Burros Act, in cooperation with her International Society for the
Protection of Mustangs and Burros (ISPMB). See Wild Horse Annie, ISPMB,
http://www.ispmb.org/Annie.html [https://perma.cc/3NMF-GWTV] (last visited Aug. 5,
2017). Annie and the ISPMB created the federal Adopt-A-Horse program in 1976. See
ISPMB Achievements, ISPMB, http://www.ispmb.org/Achievements.html [https://perma.cc
/DJ23-H5MS] (last visited Aug. 5, 2017). Her grassroots campaign to protect horses led to
the second largest outpouring of mail to Congress in legislative history, id., and ultimately
both the House and Senate passed the bill by unanimous vote. Bureau for Land Mgmt., U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior, Program History, https://www.blm.gov/programs/wild-horse-andburro/about-the-program/program-history [https://perma.cc/ZUK5-7JBF] (last visited Aug.
5, 2017).
320
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541, 541 n.10 (1976).
321
16 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (2012).
322
Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 529.
323
Id. at 535 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)) (emphasis added).
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and burros are not in fact in their native habitats, at least in the sense that the horses
had been extinct from North America for 10,000 years before the Spanish
reintroduced them.324 That did not keep Congress from passing the law itself, and it
certainly did not keep the people of Nevada from choosing a stirring scene of wild
horses for their state quarter coin in 2005.325 These horses, feral though they may be,
pull at the public heartstrings.
In California, state water law accommodates guest species by extending
minimum instream flow protections to nonnative fishes, even if those fishes are not
fully naturalized and must be periodically restocked.326 More broadly, “[p]ublic
perception and lack of support have affected efforts to manage or eradicate
vertebrate species in the US,”327 particularly for species like wild horses, primates,328
dingos in Australia,329 and redmasked parakeets in California.330
Generally, “the public does not readily distinguish between native and nonnative species: as long as an animal looks nice and is not threatening people or
causing undue harm, the public tends to view species equally.”331 Given the at worst,
indifference, and at best, adoration with which many people view guest species,
efforts to manage these species often run into strong local opposition. As others have
noted, leadership from local groups, particularly hunting and game management
groups, will be critical to guest species management, and such efforts must involve
those communities in a meaningful way.332 Attempting to manage guest species
without addressing locals who care about the species leads to serious conflict.
2. Lesson: Guest Species Can Eventually Become Part of the Local Ecosystem
At the February 2nd, 2012 meeting of the California Fish and Game
Commission, after the Commission voted 4–0 to reject the proposed reduction in
protection for striped bass populations, Commission President Jim Kellogg declared
the striped bass a “native species” in California, due to their long residence in the

324

See Brian Kooyman et al., Identification of Horse Exploitation by Clovis Hunters
Based on Protein Analysis, 66 AMERICAN ANTIQUITY 686, 686–91 (2001).
325
See Nevadans Choose Wild Horse Design for State Quarter, L.V. SUN (June 2,
2005), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2005/jun/02/nevadans-choose-wild-horse-design-forstate-quarte/ [https://perma.cc/4P5E-BUZX].
326
See Karrigan S. Börk et al., The Rebirth of California Fish & Game Code Section
5937: Water for Fish, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 874 (2012) (“[The California State Water
Resources Control Board] holding that [California Fish & Game Code Section]
5937 . . . require[s] the dam owner to keep in good condition any fish that may be planted
below the dam. The Water Board held that 5937 allowed it to require protection of the highly
valued fishery consisting most importantly of an introduced, and periodically restocked,
species.”).
327
Witmer et al., supra note 38, at 134.
328
See id.
329
See Schlaepfer et al., supra note 87, at 434.
330
See id.
331
Witmer et al., supra note 38, at 134.
332
See Banko et al., supra note 164, at 884–85.
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state.333 Science offers some support for this position. Consider the Chinook salmon
populations introduced from California to New Zealand between 1904 and 1907.334
These salmon all originated from a single fall run population of salmon in Battle
Creek, California, a Sacramento River tributary.335
Roughly 90 years later, scientists studied salmon from several populations in
New Zealand and found that salmon differed in all life history traits examined among
rivers.336 “The variable traits (age at maturity, growth rate, time of adult migration
and pawning, and freshwater residence period) are all known to be controlled by
both genetic and environmental factors,”337 suggesting “considerable adaptation to
local conditions has occurred in about 20 generations.”338 This adaptation appears to
have a genetic basis.339 Moreover, the populations in various New Zealand rivers
have already developed a strong population structure evident at the genetic level.340
In lay terms, these populations are in the process of forming new species of Chinook
salmon. Were they transplanted back into their historic homes, they would be
differentiated from the other salmon by their genetics, run timing, size, and other life
history traits.341
This is not an isolated phenomenon. Relatively rapid evolution has been
discovered in both invading species and in native species that are responding to an
invasion.342 Species like the striped bass, which has been in California for almost
150 years, have almost certainly adapted to their new environment, making them
distinct from the populations that remained in their native habitat. In a real,
biological sense, some of these guest species are evolving into new species, natives
of their new habitat. Regardless of how they arrived there, these particular guest
species populations have evolved to fit their new home, which in turn have evolved

333

Purnell, supra note 302.
See Michael T. Kinnison et al., Egg Size, Fecundity, and Development Rate of Two
Introduced New Zealand Chinook Salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) Populations, 55
CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 1946, 1946–47 (1998).
335
See id.
336
Thomas P. Quinn & Martin J. Unwin, Variation in Life History Patterns among New
Zealand Chinook Salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) Populations, 50 CAN. J. FISHERIES &
AQUATIC SCI. 1414, 1414 (1993).
337
Id. at 1420.
338
Id. at 1414.
339
See Thomas P. Quinn et al., Evolution of Chinook Salmon (Oncorhynchus
tshawytscha) Populations in New Zealand: Pattern, Rate, and Process, 112 GENETICA 493,
505−06 (2001); Thomas P. Quinn et al., Evolution of Temporal Isolation in the Wild: Genetic
Divergence in Timing of Migration and Breeding by Introduced Chinook Salmon
Populations, 54 EVOLUTION 1372, 1372 (2000) [hereinafter Evolution of Temporal
Isolation].
340
See Michael T. Kinnison et al., Reconstructing Recent Divergence: Evaluating
Nonequilibrium Population Structure in New Zealand Chinook Salmon, 11 MOLECULAR
ECOLOGY 739, 740–41 (2002).
341
See Quinn et al., Evolution of Temporal, supra note 339, at 1382.
342
See Fred Bosselman, A Dozen Biodiversity Puzzles, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 364, 451
(2004).
334
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to accommodate them.343 If native species are the species that evolved in a particular
ecosystem, or if they are the species that have coevolved with the other species in
the ecosystem, then guest species with well-established populations in their new
ecosystems probably become native species in a biological sense after as little as
twenty to thirty generations, based on the data from the New Zealand salmon.344
Removing these species shows just how well-integrated into a new ecosystem
they may be. Although some ecosystems with few modifications can recover
preinvasion dynamics,345 as a general matter it is almost impossible to predict how
an ecosystem will react to the removal of an established component of the system.
This is particularly true when the species is, like the striped bass, an apex predator
in the system—that is, a predator that regulates the abundance of many other species.
“For example, on New Zealand’s Stewart Island, invasive feral cats prey on an
endangered parrot, but the the [sic] mainstay of the of the cats’ diet is rats, which
attack the parrots nests, so elimination of the cats could harm the parrot more than it
would help it.”346 On other islands, removal of cats led to explosions of nonnative
rabbit populations, destroying native vegetation.347 Removal of Australian dingoes,
introduced to Australia by humans as domesticated dogs 3,500 years ago,348 led to
an increase in fox populations and a subsequent decrease in native marsupials.349 At
best, removal of top predators will have unknown effects, and the ecosystems “are
so highly altered that attempting to restore them to an earlier condition or stable state
is largely not possible.”350
This is all the clearer in new anthropogenic ecosystems, which ecologists often
term “novel ecosystems.”351 Novel ecosystems are characterized by “(1) novelty:
new species combinations, with the potential for changes in ecosystem functioning;
and (2) human agency: ecosystems that are the result of deliberate or inadvertent
human action, but do not depend on continued human intervention for their

343
See Wallach et al., supra note 248, at 147 (“While evolutionary novelty can hamper
coexistence in some cases, native species can also adapt through behavioral changes and trait
evolution in response to novel organisms, within only a few generations.”).
344
Quinn et al., Evolution of Temporal Isolation, supra note 339, at 1372.
345
Jesse M. Lepak et al., Rapid Food Web Recovery in Response to Removal of an
Introduced Apex Predator, 63 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 569, 571–72 (2006).
346
Bosselman, supra note 342, at 451 (citation omitted).
347
See Wallach et al., supra note 248, at 146.
348
Peter Savolainen et al., A Detailed Picture of the Origin of the Australian Dingo,
Obtained from the Study of Mitochondrial DNA, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12387,
12387 (2004). Perhaps the Dingoes have been in Australia long enough to be considered
native, in spite of their human mediated arrival on the continent. “Though dingoes are
migrants, their arrival was distant enough that they have become quintessentially Australian
and, in this sense, unique to this part of the world.” THE DINGO DEBATE: ORIGINS,
BEHAVIOUR AND CONSERVATION xi (Bradley Smith ed., 2015).
349
Wallach et al., supra note 248, at 146.
350
P. B. Moyle, Novel Aquatic Ecosystems: The New Reality for Streams in California
and Other Mediterranean Climate Regions, 30 RIVER RES. & APPLICATIONS 1335, 1335
(2014).
351
Also termed emerging or no analog ecosystems. Hobbs et al., supra note 60, at 599.
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maintenance.”352 Ecologists credit three factors for ubiquity of these ecosystems: (1)
anthropogenic local extinction of “most of the original animal, plant and microbial
populations” and the concomitant introduction of nonnative life; (2) the erection of
barriers (urban environments/degraded landscapes) to natural recolonization of
impacted sites or the reduction of sources of species for recolonization; and (3)
fundamental alterations of the abiotic environment that render the environments
unsuitable for the original ecosystem.353 We cannot turn back the clock on novel
ecosystems to restore them to a historic state. Consider the Sacramento River: full
restoration would require elimination of dams, removal of reservoirs,
reestablishment of wetlands, removal of levees . . . the list goes on and on.
Partial restorations have improved habitat in some places,354 but these efforts
will always be extremely limited and the rest of the river habitat favors nonnative
species. 355 In these systems, the habitat that allowed the original ecosystem is gone,
and many of the remaining fish—the delta smelt, the winter run Chinook salmon—
are poorly adapted to the current environment. So what should the rest of the river
look like? What species should live there? What is a native species in this new
system? The guest species in the system are at least as adapted to the novel
ecosystem as the original native species. Does that mean the guest species are natives
of the new ecosystem?
Perhaps, though, this is less a question for science and more a question of how
we decide to treat these species. When do guest species “get their green card” or
become naturalized like citizens do?356 Should there be a “path to citizenship” for
some guest species? “Traditionally, conservation goals have been defined by
historical, static benchmarks aimed at protecting flagship species and ‘pristine’

352
Richard J. Hobbs et al., Novel Ecosystems: Theoretical and Management Aspects of
the New Ecological World Order, 15 GLOBAL ECOLOGY & BIOGEOGRAPHY 1, 2 (2006)
[hereinafter Hobbs et al., New Ecological World Order]. Note that some quibble with the
latter part of that characterization, the idea these ecosystems do no depend on continued
human intervention. See Daniel Simberloff et al., “Novel Ecosystems” Are a Trojan Horse
for Conservation, ENSIA (Jan. 21, 2015), http://ensia.com/voices/novel-ecosystems-are-atrojan-horse-for-conservation/ [https://perma.cc/3837-GDWS]. It is probably too early to
determine which of these ecosystems will or will not last.
353
Hobbs et al., New Ecological World Order, supra note 352, at 2.
354
See, e.g., Peter F. Alpert et al., Riparian Forest Restoration Along Large Rivers:
Initial Results from the Sacramento River Project, 7 RESTORATION ECOLOGY 360, 361
(1999) (discussing the potential effects of dam removal along the Sacramento river); G.
Mathias Kondolf et al., Projecting Cumulative Benefits of Multiple River Restoration
Projects: An Example from the Sacramento-San Joaquin River System in California, 42
ENVTL. MGMT. 933, 938–39 (2008) (discussing reparation by replacing previously naturally
occurring gravel pits).
355
Moyle, supra note 350, at 1336 (“Alien species are particularly likely to dominate
in rivers downstream of dams where operations tend to reduce natural flow variability,
creating uniform conditions that favour aliens and discourage native species adapted for less
stable conditions, such as the California roach.”).
356
Joseph Hayes, Just the Facts: Immigrants in California, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL.
(Jan. 2017), http://www.ppic.org/publication/immigrants-in-california/ [https://perma.cc/
6E3T-Q4SJ].
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ecosystems and their putative integrity and stability . . . .”357 But in many places,
these historic systems are gone, and they aren’t coming back. In the highly altered
ecosystems that remain, no species is native, in the sense that none of the species
found there originally evolved in that modified habitat. Why, then, should we
discriminate against the nonnative species solely on the basis that they are
nonnative? Some guest species have been in their new habitat so long, “there is little
point in regretting the history that has made them part of the ecosystems they now
inhabit.”358
F. Case Study Three: The Suckers and the Trout
The first two lawsuits reflect an underlying disconnect between societal
attitudes towards guest species and conservation policy objectives. This disconnect
is pervasive, although it does not always result in litigation. For example, NEPA
analysis also demonstrates the inherent conflicts surrounding the role and
maintenance of guest species in an ecosystem that no longer supports its native
species due to anthropogenic changes. Consider the story of the cold water trout
fishery in the Flaming Gorge, Utah.
The Green River, a primary tributary of the Colorado River,359 flows down and
out of the Wind River Mountains in Wyoming, into the northeastern corner of Utah,
where it is impounded in the Flaming Gorge Reservoir by the Flaming Gorge Dam.
The river flows out of the dam and into the Flaming Gorge, a seven mile long canyon
with towering flaming red cliffs on either side.360 The Green River emerges from the
canyon into Browns Park, where it widens and shallows into several braided
channels as it flows into Colorado. Eventually, the river enters one of the most
dramatic landmarks in the West, the Gates of Lodore.361 The Green—now within
Dinosaur National Monument—flows through Lodore Canyon, where it gains the
flow of the Yampa River and then loops back into Utah. The Green continues on
through a pair of proposed dam sites, the basis of the epic showdown between David

357

Schlaepfer et al., supra note 87, at 430 (citation omitted).
Bosselman, supra note 342, at 443 (quoting William Cronon, Resisting Monoliths
and Tabulae Rasae, 10 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 473, 475 (2000)).
359
E. D. Andrews, Downstream Effects of Flaming Gorge Reservoir on the Green
River, Colorado and Utah, 97 GEOLOGICAL SOC’Y AMERICA BULL. 1012, 1013 (1986).
360
Green River Float-In Campsites, UT, RECREATION.GOV, https://www.recreation.
gov/camping/green-river-floatin-campsites/r/campgroundDetails.do?contractCode=NRSO
&parkId=117489 [https://perma.cc/YCW7-QQ6W] (last visited Aug. 5, 2017); Tom
Wharton, Flaming Gorge: The Place Few People Knew, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 17, 2012),
http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/sltrib/outdoors/53972285-117/flaming-gorge-riverwebb.html.csp [https://perma.cc/V2AQ-W5TA].
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In a typical canyon, a river drops down into the canyon itself. In Lodore Canyon, in
contrast, the canyon rises up around the Green River, and the Gates are the first towering
canyon walls that swallow the river. Joel L. Pederson & Kevin W. Hadder, Revisiting the
Classic Conundrum of the Green River’s Integration Through the Uinta Uplift, in UINTA
MOUNTAIN GEOLOGY 149, 149 (Carol M. Dehler et al. eds., 2005).
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Brower’s Sierra Club and the Bureau of Reclamation,362 before it eventually joins
the Colorado River in Canyonlands National Park, near Green River, Utah.363
Historically, as the Green River emerged from Flaming Gorge into Browns
Park, it had become a desert river,364 warm and silty,365 with summer temperatures
averaging around 20 °C.366 This was not an easy place for fish to live. The river
generally flooded with cold snowmelt in the spring, dropped to a warm, low level in
the summer, and nearly froze in the winter.367 The high variability, scouring floods,
and heavy sediment loads challenged most fish species, but a hardy contingent of
four large fish species evolved to take advantage of those conditions. These fishes
include the bizarre looking humpback chub, the bony tail sucker, the razorback
sucker, and the magnificent Colorado River pikeminnow.368 The Colorado River
pikeminnow is the largest North American member of the minnow family
(cyprinidae), historically reaching lengths of five to six feet and weights of over one
hundred pounds.369 These four river fishes live only in the Colorado River
drainage,370 and they are all now listed as federally endangered.371
The 1956 Colorado River Storage Project authorized the Flaming Gorge
reservoir on the Green River,372 with the dam located roughly thirty miles north of

362
The dams were never built, largely as a result of the work by Brower. Andrew C.
Mertha & William R. Lowry, Unbuilt Dams: Seminal Events and Policy Change in China,
Australia, and the United States, 39 COMP. POL. 1, 5 (2006). But see Mark W.T. Harvey,
Echo Park, Glen Canyon, and the Postwar Wilderness Movement, 60 PAC. HIST. R. 43, 4647 (1991).
363
Nat’l Park Serv., Rivers, NPS.GOV, https://www.nps.gov/cany/planyourvisit/rivers.
htm [https://perma.cc/VTC4-T67G] (last updated June 29, 2016).
364
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OPERATION OF FLAMING
GORGE DAM, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 53–54 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 FLAMING GORGE BIOP].
365
ROBERT T. MUTH ET AL., FLOW AND TEMPERATURE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
ENDANGERED FISHES IN THE GREEN RIVER DOWNSTREAM OF FLAMING GORGE DAM 1-7
(2000) http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documents-publications/technical-reports/isf/
flaminggorgeflowrecs.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CHZ-NEFG] (describing the historical “Green
River [as] an unregulated, turbid, temperate stream”).
366
Julian D. Olden, Challenges and Opportunities for Fish Conservation in DamImpacted Waters, in CONSERVATION OF FRESHWATER FISHES 107, 134–35 (Gerard P. Closs
et al. eds., 2016) (relating that the average pre dam temperature between May and August
was 17.2°C, with high mean temperatures in July and August around 20°C).
367
E. L. BOLKE & K. M. WADDELL, CHEMICAL QUALITY AND TEMPERATURE OF WATER
IN FLAMING GORGE RESERVOIR, WYOMING AND UTAH, AND THE EFFECT OF THE RESERVOIR
ON THE GREEN RIVER: GEOLOGICAL SURVEY WATER-SUPPLY PAPER 2039-A A2 (1975)
(“Prior to closure of the dam, the average monthly temperature of the Green River below the
damsite ranged from 0°C to 19.5°C.”).
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Eric J. Hilton & Gerald R. Smith, The American Society of Ichthyologists and
Herpetologists as an Advocacy Group: The Green River Poisoning of 1962, 2014
COPEIA 577, 578 (2014).
369
Id. at 578, 587.
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Id. at 587.
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Id. at 578.
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Vernal, Utah.373 Construction of the Flaming Gorge Dam began in 1959, and water
storage began in 1962. The reservoir provides water storage, flood control,
recreation, and hydroelectric power.374 In order to maximize the fishing recreation
potential by improving the likelihood of establishing a good trout population in the
new reservoir, the Utah Fish and Game and Wyoming Game and Fish departments
carried out a fisheries “rehabilitation” project prior to the closure of the dam.375 The
purported rehabilitation project sought to remove potential competitors and
predators of the planned trout population through a wholesale poisoning of the Green
River above and below the planned dam site.376
On September 4, 1962, workers began adding the fish poison rotenone to the
river, with poison drip sites established roughly every ten miles throughout the
Flaming Gorge and nearby areas.377 The poisoning continued for three days.378
Although the poison was supposed to be neutralized at a site twenty-six kilometers
upstream of the Dinosaur National Monument, the neutralization failed.379
Ultimately, the rotenone caused “an extensive and severe kill of aquatic
life . . . throughout some 524 miles of the Green River basin, even including the
length of Dinosaur National Monument.”380 The rehabilitation killed individuals
from twenty species of fish and over one hundred species of identified aquatic
invertebrates.381 It also decimated populations of the humpback chub, bony tail
sucker, razorback sucker, and Colorado River pikeminnow.382 The poisoning of the
Green River remains the largest deliberate river poisoning in U.S. history.383
As dire as this poisoning was, these actions predate the modern ESA, NEPA,
Clean Water Act, and indeed what many think of as the beginning of the modern
environmental movement.384 Some may be inclined to brush these actions away as
vestiges of the past, but, in terms of the modern incarnation of the guest species
problem, these events really just set the stage. The next chapter of the story illustrates
our continued difficulties in coming to terms with the way we manage guest species
in our ecosystems. This next portion of the story depends on water temperature
fluctuations throughout the Green River below the Flaming Gorge Dam.385
373
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Greendale, UT, gauge number 09234500. The period of record for temperature goes from
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Trout like cold water,386 and the river below Flaming Gorge Dam initially
proved an ideal temperature as the dam began to fill with water.387 Trout proliferated,
creating a legendary recreational fishery for both brown and rainbow trout.388 But as
the reservoir filled and stratified,389 the water released from the dam cooled to the
point that it no longer supported the vast, fast growing populations of trout that
anglers expected.390 Because—down to a few degrees above freezing—cooler water
is denser than warm water, cooler water sinks in large reservoirs, creating thermal
stratification.391 Water drawn from the deeper parts of a reservoir is much colder
than water near the surface.392 In the Flaming Gorge Reservoir, maximum
stratification occurs during the summer, with temperatures deep in the reservoir
hovering around 4 °C and temperatures at the surface reaching roughly 23 °C, with
a temperature gradient of 1.6 °C/m.393 Immediately after the reservoir filled, the
water at the fixed intake to the dam varied from 3.5 °C to 10 °C throughout the
year,394 far below the rainbow trout’s preferred temperature of roughly 13–17 °C,395
resulting in lackluster trout growth. To restore the trout fishery, the Bureau of
Reclamation and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources modified the penstock
intakes on the dam in June 1978 with the sole goal of allowing the dam operators to
draw water at the best temperature for the trout, from whatever depth that
temperature water might be at in the reservoir’s water column.396 The modified
agency_cd=USGS&amp; [https://perma.cc/US62-36B6] (last visited Aug. 5, 2017).
386
See Randall B. Filbert & Charles P. Hawkins, Variation in Condition of Rainbow
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habitat for coldwater trout fisheries in the river stretch immediately downstream of the dam,
termed a tailwater. Id.
390
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 387, at 9 (relating that “[e]xcessively cold water
temperatures depressed trout growth and detracted from the tail water’s recreational
appeal”).
391
Id.
392
Id.
393
BOLKE & WADDELL, supra note 367, at A13.
394
See id. at A2.
395
E. T. Garside & J. S. Tait, Preferred Temperature of Rainbow Trout (Salmo
Gairdneri Richardson) and Its Unusual Relationship to Acclimation Temperature, 36 CAN.
J. ZOOLOGY 563, 563 (1958); K. E. F. Hokanson et al., Effects of Constant Temperatures and
Diel Temperature Fluctuations on Specific Growth and Mortality Rates and Yield of Juvenile
Rainbow Trout, Salmo gairdneri, 34 J. FISHERIES RES. BOARD CAN. 639, 639 (1977).
396
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, UPPER COLO. DIV.,
NEGATIVE DETERMINATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT A-3 (1976) (observing “The
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intakes allowed for much warmer summer water, in the trout’s ideal growth range,397
and growth shot up three fold.398 As a result, angler harvest, use, and yield
dramatically increased,399 and the Green River below Flaming Gorge Dam remains
one of the top ten trout fishing areas in the United States.400 Fishing guides know the
river sections close to the dam as “the aquarium,” due to the crystal clear water and
the many trout.401 Utah officials estimate fish densities up to 22,000 fish per mile.402
It is a great place to catch a trout, and it has proved an economic boon to the region
and the state. As of 2005, an estimated 83,500 people per year visit the Green River
below the dam,403 with direct expenditures by river visitors of roughly $21.4 million
per year.404
Although the trout, the fishermen, and the regional economy have fared very
well with the dam and the modified temperature regime, not so the native fishes. The
introduced trout species generally do not directly interact with native fishes, because
the species require a markedly different temperature regime than the native fishes.405
But places that trout love make poor habitat for the historic fishes of the Upper
Colorado River Basin.
Managers demarcate the Green River into three management reaches below the
dam: reach 1: from the Flaming Gorge Dam to the Yampa River confluence (river
mile (“RM”) 410 to 345 (upstream numbers are higher)), where flow and
temperature are almost entirely dam dependent; reach 2: from the Yampa River
confluence to the White River confluence (RM 345 to 246), where flow and
temperature depend on both inflow from the Yampa River and releases from
Flaming Gorge Dam; and reach 3: from the White River confluence to Colorado

purpose of the penstock modifications is to increase the Green River tailwater temperatures
to improve trout production and the recreational fishery use.”). The penstocks created several
possible inlet levels and allowed the dam operators to choose the level of water withdrawal
from the reservoir, and those the temperature of the released water. Id.
397
Olden, supra note 366, at 134 (relating that the average post dam temperature from
May to August increased from 5.7°C to 11°C after the modification, with average high temps
in July and August around 13°C or 14°C).
398
Id. at 2.
399
Id. at 69.
400
See, e.g., David Knapp, 18 Greatest Trout Streams in the Western U.S. and Canada,
WIDE OPEN SPACES (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.wideopenspaces.com/18-best-troutstreams-western-us-canada-pics/ [https://perma.cc/B42Y-5XCB]; John Merwin, John
Merwin Fishes America’s Best Tailwater: Utah’s Green River, FIELD & STREAM (Mar. 31,
2005), http://www.fieldandstream.com/articles/fishing/fly-fishing/where-fish/2005/03/johnmerwin-fishes-americas-best-tailwater-utahs-gre [https://perma.cc/5BSG-Q8DY].
401
Merwin, supra note 400.
402
Green River Details, GREEN RIVER FLY FISHER, http://www.greenriverflyfisher.com
/river.php [https://perma.cc/YZ5C-7PQ7] (last visited Aug. 5, 2017).
403
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, UPPER COLO. REGION,
OPERATION OF FLAMING GORGE DAM: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT App282, A-297 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 FLAMING GORGE EIS]. Of note, visitation on the
reservoir created by the dam is roughly ten times higher than the river visitation. Id.
404
Id.
405
See MUTH ET AL., supra note 365, at 1-6.
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River confluence (RM 246 to 0), where more natural conditions predominate.406 The
endangered fish populations in the Green River generally stay downstream of reach
1 (below the Yampa River confluence), because the unregulated Yampa restores the
more natural river flow, sediment load, and temperature profile the native fishes
require for survival and successful reproduction.407
Low temperatures below the dam prevent pikeminnow from breeding in reach
1408 and have eliminated bony tail and humpback chub from much of their former
habitat.409 As a reference point, trout may experience negative impacts at water
temperatures above 18 °C,410 although they may be able to tolerate temperatures as
high as 24 °C under some conditions.411 In contrast, reproduction for the listed
species does not occur below 18 °C.412 When reproduction does occur, growth of all
of the endemic Colorado River fishes is dramatically faster at temperatures above
20 °C—perhaps even orders of magnitude faster—resulting in far higher survival.413
Water temperatures below 22 °C have severe negative impacts on development and
growth of young Colorado pikeminnow, virtually halting growth in many cases.414
For these fishes, thermal modification to warm the rivers is likely the only way to
increase successful reproduction below the dam,415 and successful restoration efforts
cannot afford to disregard river stretches immediately below dams.416
The science is clear that warmer waters will improve the survival of these native
fishes. The 1992 Biological Opinion (“BiOp”) recognized the role of water
temperatures:
The change in water temperatures as a result of impoundments is believed
to be one of the causes for the decline in rare and endangered fish
406

Id. at 3-6 to 3-8.
See id. at 1-8.
408
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE OPERATION
OF FLAMING GORGE DAM 13 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 FLAMING GORGE BIOP]. For Colorado
pikeminnow, temperatures resulting in optimum spawning period range from 20 or 22 to 25,
and spawning appears to be temperature dependent. Id.
409
Robert W. Clarkson & Michael R. Childs, Temperature Effects of HypolimnialRelease Dams on Early Life Stages of Colorado River Basin Big-River Fishes, 2000
COPEIA 402, 402–03 (2000). Humpback chub require temperatures above 17oC to begin their
spawning activities, and their young need long, warm growing seasons to stimulate fish
growth. MUTH ET AL., supra note 365, at 5-4.
410
2005 FLAMING GORGE EIS, supra note 403, at S-35.
411
Filbert & Hawkins, supra note 386, at 824. Boughton et al. found no drop in
steelhead growth rates at temperatures up to 16.5oC in conditions of high food availability.
David A. Boughton et al., Stream Temperature and the Potential Growth and Survival of
Juvenile Oncorhynchus mykiss in a Southern California Creek, 52 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY
1353, 1353 (2007).
412
1992 FLAMING GORGE BIOP, supra note 408, at 13. For Colorado pikeminnow,
temperatures resulting in optimum spawning period, range from 20 or 22 to 25, and spawning
appears to be temperature dependent. Id.
413
Clarkson & Childs, supra note 409, at 407.
414
MUTH ET AL., supra note 365, at 4-26.
415
Clarkson & Childs, supra note 409, at 410.
416
Id.
407
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throughout the Colorado River Basin. Water temperature was shown to
influence spawning migrations, spawning, egg viability, larval survival,
feeding, and growth of endangered fish. Providing warmer water during
critical life history periods could further benefit the affected fish.417
The scientific paper underlying the 2005 BiOp also acknowledged the myriad
benefits of warmer water:
Warmer water would provide cues for adults migrating to spawning areas,
aid gonadal maturation, enhance the likelihood of reproduction by
Colorado pikeminnow in Lodore Canyon, and enhance growth of early life
stages of fishes in nursery habitat . . . . Improving [temperature] conditions
in Lodore Canyon also could result in expansion of endangered fish
populations . . . .418
In recent years, Colorado pikeminnow have once again begun spawning just
above the confluence with the Yampa, but only after water temperatures were
marginally increased under the latest Dam BiOp.419 To sum up the science, if a dam
were truly to be operated in a way that favored native river fishes, the temperature
of water releases would be as high as possible.
In fact, the Flaming Gorge Dam is supposed to be operated in a way that favors
native river fishes.420 Indeed, the dam officially serves as native fish mitigation for
the Upalco, Jensen, and Uinta Units of the Bureau of Reclamation’s Central Utah
Project, the Duchesne River Basin Project, the proposed Narrows Project, the
ongoing Price-San Rafael Salinity Control Project, and other water development
related projects in the Colorado River Basin.421 The 2005 Flaming Gorge BiOp
requires that the dam and reservoir “compensate for those depletions and be operated
for the benefit of the endangered fishes in conjunction with [their] other authorized
purposes.”422 Thus the Flaming Gorge Dam should be protecting and conserving the
listed species downstream, but the biological opinions authorizing operation of the
dam have largely written off conservation of the listed species in Reach 1, the first
sixty-five miles below the dam.
Even though the BiOp for the 1992 Flaming Gorge Operations FEIS “is fully
intended to benefit the endangered Colorado River fish,”423 it ignored the potential
for recovery in the first reach below the dam and instead only recommended target
temperatures and flows beginning near Jensen, Utah, ninety-eight miles downstream
from the dam.424 The BiOp agreed that “[p]resent operation of Flaming Gorge Dam
417

1992 FLAMING GORGE BIOP, supra note 408, at 32.
MUTH ET AL., supra note 365, at 5-13 (alteration added).
419
Clarkson & Childs, supra note 409, at 410.
420
2005 FLAMING GORGE BIOP, supra note 364, at 4–5.
421
Id.
422
2005 FLAMING GORGE EIS, supra note 403, at S-6
423
2005 FLAMING GORGE BIOP, supra note 364, at 91.
424
Id. at 3.
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through [reach 1] does not provide desirable flow and temperature conditions for
endangered fish,”425 even though “[t]he dominant factor influencing water
temperature in Reach 1 is the temperature of water released from Flaming Gorge
Dam.”426 By avoiding temperature targets for reach 1—where the trout-based sports
fishery operates—the 1992 BiOp avoided much of the inherent conflict between
management for trout and management for native species. Nevertheless, the 1992
BiOp required the Bureau to:
[D]etermine the feasibility and effects of releasing warmer water during
the late spring/summer period . . . [because] water temperatures in the
Green River between Flaming Gorge Dam and the confluence with the
Yampa River in Echo Park often remain below those deemed suitable for
reproduction and growth of the endangered fish species . . . .427
The 1992 temperature requirements left reach 1 far too cold for native species and
left much of reach 2 too cold for consistent use by the listed species.
In the 2005 BiOp, and the 2000 technical report underlying it, regulators again
largely ignore reach 1. The 2000 technical report noted, “[r]ecommendations for
Reach 1 are limited to Lodore Canyon because suitable water temperatures and other
habitat needs are unlikely to be met upstream of the canyon. . . . [S]pecific
recommendations for those species in Reach 1 are not warranted at this time.”428
“[H]abitat for endangered fishes in Reach 1 is limited to Lodore Canyon because the
summer water temperatures upstream are too cold . . . .”429
They are too cold, in large part, because the dam operators choose water from
the Flaming Gorge Reservoir that is ideal for the introduced trout, not the native
fishes, and because of the decisions the dam operators made when installing the
modified penstocks in 1978.
Nevertheless, the operators of the dam currently have some wiggle room in how
they manage temperatures based on movement of the penstocks, but they tend to use
that wiggle room to benefit the guest species. The 2000 technical report
recommended that the dam operators release “relatively warm water from Flaming
Gorge Reservoir (up to 15°C),”430 which would result in water that would be barely
within the listed species tolerance limits in the lower reaches of Lodore Canyon.431
Even this target, which favors the trout fishery over the listed species,432 has not been
425

1992 FLAMING GORGE BIOP, supra note 408, at 24–25.
MUTH ET AL., supra note 365, at 3-32. Under the 1992 BiOp, “[r]eservoir operators
adjust the withdrawal system to find a layer of water with a temperature of 13°C [(55°F)]
throughout the summer, so that a constant temperature of release water is maintained until
mid-October,” when the released water is colder. Id.
427
Id. at 1-9.
428
Id. at 5-1.
429
Id. at xxvi.
430
Id. at xxvii.
431
Id. at 5-10.
432
Id. at 4-92. The preference for trout extends beyond the exclusion of native fish from
reach 1. Under the new temperature guidelines, the Service is still expecting mortality “as a
426

2018]

OUR APPROACH TO BIODIVERSITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE

221

achieved. Under the current BiOp, the dam’s “[o]perational guidelines direct
operators to achieve maximum gate elevation (40 feet below reservoir surface) by
June 15 of each year in order to deliver outflow temperatures of 15.0-16.0 °C, [as
measured at the Greendale Gage, USGS 09234500] . . . during the summer
months,”433 but “[r]eleases of water from Flaming Gorge Dam averaged 13.5 °C
(56.3 °F) from June through September 2013 and temperatures in excess of 16 °C
(60.8 °F) occurred once on July 24.”434
This account should not be read to entirely fault the current dam operators and
the many technical experts and others working on Flaming Gorge temperature
issues. In some ways, Flaming Gorge Dam was committed to management for trout
in 1978 when the modified inlets were added to the dam. They are designed to favor
water temperatures that benefit trout and do not allow for release of water from the
top level of the reservoir, which averages 23 °C during the summer.435 And some of
the equipment in the dam may face challenges operating with water temperatures
above 15.5 °C, although the nature and extent of the challenges are unclear.436 The
dam operations are saddled with a legacy that explicitly prefers the continuation of
an introduced trout fishery to the detriment of the native listed fishes, and the more
recent temperature analysis has just perpetuated that preference.
This aspect of the Green River story best highlights another reason guest
species lead to conflict—the trout at issue here have been favored guests for so long
that humanity has reshaped the local ecosystem itself to make them feel at home,
and the novel ecosystem cannot coexist with the native species. When the Utah Fish
and Game and Wyoming Game and Fish Departments poisoned the Green River in
September 1962, and the Bureau of Reclamation and the Utah Fish and Game
Department modified the penstocks in 1978 to deliver the ideal temperature for trout
not native fishes, the ecosystem itself was remade into a perfect trout habitat. This
places the trout in conflict with the native species, but it does so in a way that largely
escapes attention under existing environmental law.

result of drifting Colorado pikeminnow larvae in the Yampa River being exposed to thermal
shock of differing water temperature in the Green River at their confluence,” 2005 FLAMING
GORGE BIOP, supra note 364, at 4-91 to 4-92, and suggests that the larva may require
“temperature differences between the two rivers [of] 2°C or less.”
433
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ANNUAL REPORT OF
OPERATIONS FOR FLAMING GORGE DAM, WATER YEAR 2013 16–17 (2015) [hereinafter
OPERATIONS REPORT].
434
Id. at 17.
435
BOLKE & WADDELL, supra note 367, at A13.
436
OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 433, at 17 (“On July 24, operating temperatures
on one of the units exceeded equipment thresholds, a high temperature alarm sounded, and
as a result SWS gates were lowered to 45 vertical feet below the surface of the reservoir.
Temperature of water passing through the unit at the time of the alarm was 15.6° C (60.0
°F). On July 29, high water temperatures were once again recorded and SWS gates were
lowered an additional 5 vertical feet.”).
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1. Lesson: Guest Species May Be Better Adapted for the Current Environment
than Native Species
In the Flaming Gorge, the dam and modified penstock system have changed the
ecosystem to make it ideal for trout, which virtually eliminates the native fish species
from the tail water stretch of the river. This habitat manipulation was deliberate,
originally a choice to favor the nonnative trout, but managers now operate largely
within the constraints set up by prior managers’ decisions. Without serious
investment and retooling of the penstocks and the hydropower equipment, managers
are unable to return the habitat to its historic conditions.437
This same scenario plays out in ecosystems everywhere. In the example of the
striped bass, the listed species in the Delta are in trouble not because of the striped
bass itself, but because of anthropogenic habitat manipulation. The listed winter run
Chinook salmon face extinction in part because large dams block access to their
entire historic spawning habitat.438 They are able to spawn only in the tail water
below Shasta Dam, and they require cold-water releases from the reservoir to spawn
there.439 Warmer water temperatures due to prolonged drought or from other
climate-change induced impacts will result in their extinction.440 Similarly, delta
smelt face extinction due to habitat loss, drought, climate change, and large scale
water exports from the Delta.441 Most of the fishes doing well in the Delta today are
nonnative, and climate change will make the situation worse for the natives. A
multifactor analysis of California fish populations under future climate scenarios
found that “[m]ost native fishes will suffer population declines and become more
restricted in their distributions; some will likely be driven to extinction. . . . In
contrast, most alien fishes will thrive, with some species increasing in abundance
and range.”442 In these systems, removing nonnative species will not restore the
original systems. Indeed, they may just be the only species that can thrive in the
novel ecosystems themselves. “A conservation strategy that eradicates species
437

Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Species in the Spotlight: Sacramento River
Winter-Run Chinook Salmon, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/stories/2015/09/spotlight_chinook
_salmon.html [https://perma.cc/93K4-7TYA] (last visited Aug. 5, 2017).
438
Such a modification has already been completed at Shasta Dam, in California, to
provide cold water for salmon to spawn downstream in the Sacramento River, and is under
consideration for Glen Canyon Dam, to provide warmer summer waters for a new population
of humpback chub in the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon. Tracy B. Vermeyen,
An Overview of the Design Concept and Hydraulic Modeling of the Glen Canyon Dam MultiLevel Intake Structure, in WATERPOWER ‘99: HYDRO’S FUTURE: TECHNOLOGY, MARKETS
AND POLICY 1, 1 (1999).
439
Id.
440
Peter B. Moyle et al., Climate Change Vulnerability of Native and Alien Freshwater
Fishes of California: A Systematic Assessment Approach, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2013).
441
Jane Kay, Delta Smelt, Icon of California Water Wars, Is Almost Extinct, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 3, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/04/150403-smeltcalifornia-bay-delta-extinction-endangered-species-drought-fish/ [https://perma.cc/THG66W78].
442
Moyle et al., supra note 440, at 1.
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simply because they are non-native could undermine the very biological entities that
may be the most likely to succeed in a rapidly changing world.”443
Reconciliation ecology, the “[s]cience of inventing, establishing, and
maintaining new habitats to conserve species diversity in places where people live,
work, or play,”444 offers one potential solution. Reconciliation ecology recognizes
that much of our landscape consists of heavily managed habitats, habitats we are
unwilling or unable to give up due to their economic importance, their location in
the midst of our cities, or their centrality to our culture. We are unlikely to remove
the ring dams around the Central Valley in California, or the major reservoirs
throughout the Midwest that make the Mississippi River navigable. We need
farmland to grow our food, energy to power our technology, and cities where we can
live. These activities necessarily compromise habitat, but that habitat need not be
written off. Instead, reconciliation ecologists seek to conserve species diversity in
those compromised habitats to manage ecosystems in the places we live.445
“Reconciling novel ecosystems involves . . . : (1) setting realistic policy goals
(including which species to favour); (2) understanding the basic ecology of the
managed systems; (3) taking into account the needs of diverse segments of society;
and (4) managing river flows and infrastructure on a more holistic basis . . . .” 446 As
these three case studies show, the very first step, “setting realistic policy goals
(including which species to favour),” is a step we have not taken. We have “the
responsibility to determine what we want these integrated ecosystems to look like
and what species we want them to contain,”447 but thus far we have abdicated that
responsibility.
2. Lesson: Existing Approaches to Guest Species Aren’t Working
Ultimately, the Flaming Gorge trout call out the biggest questions about guest
species. What should we do with them? They are here, they are not going away even
with herculean efforts, and they will require ongoing management if we want to see
a noticeably different species balance than what we have right now. As others have
noted, this is largely a normative question. “[T]he decision process should start by
asking the question ‘what kind of ecosystem do we want?’ The answer to the
question will depend on societal values . . . and on views of what is actually possible
as climate and other change occurs.”448 The easy answer, that the species we have
added to an ecosystem are bad and should be removed, does not suffice. This facile
analysis, which builds on the false dichotomy between humanity and nature,
ultimately fails as a guidance metric. “Philosophically, we question how human
actions differ from those of other species. In other words, why is a dispersal event
443
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that is facilitated by, say, a migratory bird or storm event . . . considered natural,
whereas a human-transported species is non-native and thus undesirable . . . ?”449
Even when focusing on the question of what species we should seek to
maintain, the scientific community is divided.450 And, as noted above, the idea that
any human-mediated migration is a bad thing fails in light of the needed assisted
migrations in the face of climate change. “[I]n some instances, the movement of
species to new locations is a natural and desirable way of adapting to environmental
change.”451 “One study estimates that climate change is forcing species to relocate
at a rate ten times faster than occurred during the climate change at the end of the
last ice age.”452 In short, “[n]early two centuries on from the introduction of the
concept of nativeness, it is time for conservationists to focus much more on the
functions of species, and much less on where they originated.”453 What should guide
our decisionmaking with respect to guest species?
Some restoration ecologists propose a return to earlier ecosystem states. Much
of the “[s]trong opposition to non-native species comes from those who wish to
retain the historical character of a region[,]”454 but in many cases, we can no longer
turn back the clock. The anthropocene label heralds many global changes,
directional changes, moving ecosystems away from historical norms at rates too fast
for evolution or other adaptation to handle. Many ecosystems face local scale
alterations that preclude survival of listed species absent ongoing human
manipulation. Even if we could turn back the clock, we would face the question of
which ecosystem to aim for and from which historical period. In the Midwest, would
we seek to restore the native prairie as an ocean of grass? This open ecosystem was
maintained only by regular burning by indigenous groups, and a more historic
ecosystem in those areas would be an oak woodland.455 In the West, would we allow
wild horses? Ancestral wild horses were a part of the western landscape for
thousands of years, before they were hunted to extinction, and the “second round”
of wild horses have lived in the West for hundreds of years.456 Or should one mimic
the landscapes from the interim years, when horses were absent? Or would we

449
Schlaepfer et al., supra note 87, at 434; see also Bosselman, supra note 342, at 442
(“But what makes a species ‘exotic’? Any attempt to define ‘exotic’ species must address
the issue of unassisted migration versus introduction by humans.”).
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Bosselman, supra note 342, at 443 (“Finding agreement among biologists about the
desirability of particular exotic species has been difficult.”).
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Id. at 506.
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Id. at 450.
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Davis et al., supra note 89, at 154. But see Simberloff, supra note 98, at 36.
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Schlaepfer et al., supra note 87, at 434.
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John M. Briggs et al., Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Vegetation Within the Flint
Hills, 100 TRANSACTIONS KAN. ACAD. SCI. 10, 12 (1997); Fred B. Samson et al., Great
Plains Ecosystems: Past, Present, and Future, 32 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULL. 6, 9 (2004).
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Brian Kooyman et al., Identification of Horse Exploitation by Clovis Hunters Based
on Protein Analysis, 66 AMERICAN ANTIQUITY 686, 687 (2001).
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mimic the landscapes from the years horses were absent? Return to an historic
landscape does not provide an easy way out of this debate.457
Could we leave the ecosystems as they are, abdicating any management
responsibility? As Peter Moyle argues, “[t]he key for maintaining
desirable . . . species and conditions in . . . ecosystems is active management
towards a defined set of goals.”458 This requires well defined goals. As discussed
above,459 Doremus, argued that “[p]rotecting wild species and ecosystems
means . . . leaving the future of those species or ecosystems to the ordinary processes
of evolution, rather than steering them deliberately toward some human vision of
usefulness or beauty.”460 The birth of the Anthropocene challenges this view and
strongly suggests that a nature where humans seek to minimize their intervention is
a nature very different—and arguably much impoverished—from the one we see
around us right now.
Deciding what to do with guest species, value laden as it is, requires hard
choices. Do we favor native species over guest species? Do we favor native species
when their ecosystems have changed and their former habitats no longer exist? Do
we favor native species when they are unlikely to persist in their current habitats
over the longer term? Refusing to answer these questions is unlikely to end well for
native species, healthy ecosystems, and all of us who depend on them. Further, these
questions should not be left to the courts—as the palila and striped bass cases
suggest, courts are not well-equipped to make these normative decisions,
particularly without any comprehensive federal legislation providing guidance.
Ignoring the problem or returning to a historical baseline simply will not
produce acceptable results. As others have noted, “[t]he Anthropocene invites a
critical reassessment of the principles that guide environmental law.”461 “[S]ince the
disruptions of the Anthropocene have begun, and will continue, human society needs
to guide its adaptation by recognizing a new set of legal principles.”462 Resolving
these questions requires a rethinking of our modern environmental philosophy.
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SUSAN J. ARMSTRONG & RICHARD G. BOTZLER, THE ANIMAL ETHICS READER 542
(2016) (Suggesting of ecologists in the future, “[i]nstead of determining what species
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IV. TOWARD DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MANAGEMENT
IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
As noted in the Introduction, much of our modern environmental law holds the
Balance of Nature myth as its philosophical foundation. To reiterate:
the Balance of Nature myth has three basic features: First, Nature,
undisturbed by human influences, achieves a permanency of form and
structure that persists indefinitely. Second, this permanent condition is the
best condition for Nature: best for other creatures, best for the
environment, and best for humans. Third, when disturbed from this perfect
state, Nature is capable of returning to it.463
This myth embodies both the idea of ecosystems as generally permanent and humans
as a force outside the ecosystems bent on disturbing them.464 Rejecting this myth
raises serious philosophical concerns about what exactly we are protecting.
These philosophical concerns seem particularly pressing because some
commentators have used the reexamination of balance of nature to launch an attack
on the foundations of environmental protection.465 The idea that there is no inherent
balance to nature, no “right” natural kind of ecosystem for a given location, has led
some to conclude there is no ethical responsibility to protect nature at all.
Ecologists embraced the balance of nature myth in their descriptions of
ecosystems, viewing the ecosystem as a self regulating entity that, absent outside
disturbance, tended to maintain itself over time.466 Although the equilibrium view of
ecosystems does not require a separatist view of humanity, such a view has been
implicit in the equilibrium view from the beginning. For example, in 1936,
Clements, the father of the equilibrium or balance view, cautioned that “[m]an alone
can destroy the stability of the [ecosystem] during the long period of control by its
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Botkin, supra note 25, at 26.
See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories,
and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 344 (1995) (blending the disequilibrium concept
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climate, and he accomplishes this by fragments in consequence of a destruction that
is selective, partial or complete, and continually renewed.”467
To ecologists, one’s view of an ecosystem does not prescribe an ethical
approach, but simply informs how one understands ecosystem functions through
time. To the extent that the environmental movement understood the ecosystem
approach as requiring or justifying an ethical view, that understanding seems to stem
from the preexisting balance of nature view discussed above.468 Nevertheless, the
ecosystem paradigm shift away from the equilibrium view and its longstanding
association with a separatist philosophy has offered some an opportunity to argue
that environmentalists are artificially and unfairly targeting human impacts on the
environment. “The newly popularized view of nature as an erratic, competitive
phenomenon . . . has provided moral and scientific justification for the attempted
backlash against social and legal programs protecting it.”469 Those opposing the
forces of conservation used this opportunity to revive arguments that the human
impact on nature is just one among the uncountable collection of hard knocks
delivered between and among Earth’s species. If there is no balance, no integrated
symbiotic whole, then, as one commentator asked: “why not go ahead with all our
private ambitions, free of any fear that we may be doing special damage?”470 “[A]
vision of nature in motion . . . and of a nature that encompasses humans as well—
wipes away the concept of a stable balance of nature, and along with it the dividing
line between what is human and what is nature, what is presumptively good and
presumptively bad.”471 Myriad attacks on modern environmentalism exploit this
angle, on issues ranging from the birth of the modern environmental movement,472
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(1990).
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to management of old growth forests,473 to climate change,474 to the entire federal
environmental framework.475
This is not merely an academic struggle; the emerging ethos shows up in both
the lay view and in management approaches. For example, the climate skeptic
websites are rife with “there is no balance of nature” arguments,476 which essentially
make the argument that anthropogenic carbon emissions are not upsetting the natural
carbon cycle, because that cycle was never inherently balanced in the first place, and
thus there is no balance to upset. Kuhlmann provides an excellent overview of the
dangers of this approach bleeding into management decisions, as embodied in the
Forest Service’s ecosystem management:
This new approach gives the full range of human action within a forest
equal standing with those structural and functional elements of the
“system” which are biologically interactive and interdependent from an
ecological and evolutionary perspective. . . . In these proposed Forest
Service regulations, I see the legal echo of the imperial ecologist/historian
claim that we inhabit “a planet in which the human and the natural can no
longer be distinguished” or the characterization of wilderness as largely a
“complex cultural construction.”477
If the human and the natural cannot be distinguished, and wilderness is largely
a cultural construction, then the biological costs that humanity imposes on forests
for its own benefit cease to be their own responsibility and instead are just part of
the eternal struggle between coequal species.478 In short, “[a]dmitting that change is
473

ALSTON CHASE, IN A DARK WOOD: THE FIGHT OVER FORESTS AND THE RISING
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See Michael Rivero, Climategate: A Crime Against Humanity, WHAT REALLY
HAPPENED,
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[https://perma.cc/R3J9-JH6D] (last visited Aug. 5, 2017); Daniel B. Botkin, Botkin and the
Balance of Nature, SKEPTECO (Feb. 17, 2013), https://skepteco.wordpress.com/2013/02/17/
botkin-and-the-balance-of-nature/ [https://perma.cc/W4YU-LFST] (book review).
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Kuhlmann, supra note 41, at 155–56.
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Further,
rather than moving toward a clearer picture and public understanding of the
biological costs of intensive forest manipulation (e.g., more conservation biology
in environmental impact statements), the strategy is to commingle the biological
needs of other species with the socio-economic needs and desires of humans,
thereby avoiding any separate accounting for the impoverishment of the land. In
simple terms, even if species and rare habitats are being threatened and lost at
unprecedented rates, if the benefits to human needs and desires are substantial
enough, then the net impact of a management plan is deemed positive and can be
proclaimed “good for the ecosystem.”
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necessary seems to open a Pandora’s box of problems for environmentalists. The
fear is simple: Once we have admitted that some kinds of changes are good, how
then can we argue against any changes—against any alteration of the
environment?”479
The answer cannot be that we should recognize human activities in ecosystems
as just another natural force in a chaotic system, thereby placing our whims on a
coequal footing with ecosystem health. We must reject these calls as the
smokescreen they are. Recognizing that ecosystems change, and that humanity is a
part of those ecosystems, does away with the easy shorthand that natural is good and
that human interference is bad.480 But it simply does not follow that all human
impacts on ecosystems are acceptable or, because they are natural, that they are
therefore unobjectionable. If the Anthropocene teaches us anything, it is that human
environmental impacts are different in character from most other biogenic impacts.
Anthropogenic change can be differentiated from “natural” change based on its
unusually fast rate and degree, which tends to outstrip the ability of most ecosystems,
and, indeed, life itself to adapt to new conditions.481 Moreover, “human
activities . . . cause linear, unidirectional, continuous change that take[] us into
realms beyond the experience of ecological systems.”482 These changes, like
increasing carbon dioxide in the air and nitrogen in the water, are likely to move
ecosystems out of the cycles to which we are accustomed and into “areas beyond the
ability of science to foresee the effect on the natural world.”483 Consider again the
potential markers of the Anthropocene: widespread deposition of plastic;484 globally
distributed fuel ash;485 increased global temperatures;486 increased CO2 levels
resulting in ocean acidification; the radiocarbon bomb spike;487 increased nitrate
concentrations essentially everywhere;488 the presence of anthropogenic persistent
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organic pollutants;489 and widespread extinction and other changes in biodiversity.490
Not since the Great Extinction Event 2.4 billion years ago, when photosynthesizing
bacteria poisoned most existing life by creating the modern oxygenated atmosphere,
has any other organism made global changes like these. Arguing that anthropogenic
changes should get the same treatment as any other natural change simply is not
tenable. Or perhaps the changes should get the same treatment that any other change
would, if other changes paralleled these anthropogenic changes in degree. The
distinction is unlikely to matter for most major anthropogenic ecosystem impacts,
given the degree of our impacts.491 Regardless of the natural or anthropogenic origin
of significant impacts on a given ecosystem, if the impacts are destroying the
ecosystem, we tend to seek to address the impacts. Just as human actions in
ecosystems are not inherently bad, they are not inherently good and acceptable. We
can distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable human impacts. As Michael
Pollan notes, “it is possible to make distinctions between kinds and degrees of
human intervention in nature. Isn’t the difference between the Ile de France and
Love Canal, or a pine forest and a condo development, proof enough that the choice
isn’t really between ‘all or nothing’?”492 Accepting, then, that not all human
activities are permissible as merely part of nature, the question remains: what
normative values should guide conservation work in the Anthropocene?
Other commentators have begun the difficult process of establishing new
normative guidance through “a lively debate about how to re-imagine our
relationship with the places that shape us as individuals, communities, and
nations.”493 Most of the principles bandied about fall into a short list of general
489

Id.
Id. at aad2622-7 to -8.
491
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The non-equilibrium paradigm does not undermine the need for biodiversity
protection because it accepts the principal lessons of ecology, that unregulated,
humans can damage ecosystems, and that the magnitude of human intervention is
often too great. In many instances, the paradigm strengthens the scientific case for
ecosystem management while exacerbating the politics of that management. The
non-equilibrium scale of management is larger and the emphasis is on the
maintenance of processes that produced undisturbed systems. The new paradigm
is also the basis for the argument that since nature is in flux, human change is just
another “flux” to be tolerated; however, ecologists reject this argument because it
undermines the functional, historical and evolutionary limits of nature.
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concepts: environmental rights,494 sustainable development,495 resilience,
“biophilia” or appreciation of nature,496 and large scale protection of coupled
social/natural systems (“ecoscapes”).497 Just as, in “the 1960s, modern
environmental law emerged as a key expression of a new social awareness of the
deteriorating environmental conditions,” these concepts may emerge from the
environmental law community as a social response to the depth of the Anthropocene
crisis.498 This discussion is only beginning, and I suggest several additional
principles that merit consideration: maintenance of natural biogeochemical cycles;
giving ecosystems space and time to develop natural dynamics like local adaptations
and population structure; embracing the notion that manmade nature is better than
nothing; and perhaps that less management is better than more management.499
These ideas need development, criticism, and additional research, and this Article is
only a first step into a long and, I hope, productive discussion.
Among the principles others have proposed, environmental rights, appreciation,
resilience, and conservation of ecoscapes seem to be the most promising, and some
of these principles provide guidance on the question of guest species. Environmental
A. Robinson, Keynote: Sustaining Society in the Anthropocene Epoch, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 467, 467 (2013); Robinson, supra note 461, at 13.
494
Robinson, supra note 461, at 13 (“Nations are reacting to the new demands by
promulgating substantive environmental rights and procedural means to enforce those rights.
Environmental rights seek to shift society toward attaining societal wellbeing, or happiness,
and not economic growth as such.”). “This new paradigm of environmental rights is being
forged, incrementally, across and within nations worldwide.” Id. at 16. The environmental
rights paradigm can be envisioned narrowly, encompassing only human rights and including
other principles like sufficiency, wellbeing or happiness, justice, and cooperation. Id. It can
also be envisioned more broadly, including foresight and justice for nature itself. Id.
495
Robinson, supra note 493, at 467–68. Sustainable development is unlikely to suffice
as a principle to address the Anthropocene, as it has thus far large encouraged business as
usual. “At the plane of international law, and at the national law level, it must be conceded
that the promise of ‘sustainable development’ remains elusive, despite many best efforts to
embrace the many sensible prescriptions around the concept.” Id. at 475–76.
[W]e must admit that we have no idea what we can sustain. Our overarching thesis
can be summarized with this three-pronged analysis: (1) sustainability goals for
natural resources and the environment are based on assumptions of stationarity,
(2) climate change and associated ecological dynamics are eliminating our ability
to rely on stationarity, and therefore (3) we need a new paradigm for a world of
continual change.
Benson, supra note 493, at 112–13.
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rights and conservation of ecoscapes seem to lack the specificity needed to analyze
the guest species issue, as they seem more about conservation of natural systems
generally than about what kind of natural system to conserve or the hard decisions
that factor into management of these systems.
Nicholas Robinson proposed “appreciation” to recognize “our positive instincts
about nature.”500 Others note “humans do feel instinctively drawn to the natural
world. Even the most minimal access to green space has been shown to expedite
healing in hospital patients, help children learn more effectively in schools, increase
productivity in the workplace and help people find mental solace overall. People
report feeling at peace when immersed in nature and often report a sense of being
part of something larger.”501 People who participate in outdoor recreation tend to
engage in proenvironment behavior at much higher levels than the general public.502
Promoting this appreciation requires inducing people to interact with nature, and, as
noted above, these interactions often include or depend on guest species.
Removing guest species may have the effect of excluding people from places
or activities they love and devalues the appreciation people have for guest species,
likely reducing their proenvironment attitudes. It may also, as seen in the goat case
study, result in direct action by the public to frustrate conservation efforts. This
principle suggests that access to nature-based recreation, including guest species,
will be vital for future conservation efforts. This does not suggest that species like
the goats should not be controlled or removed, only that, in doing so, resource
agencies should balance public desires and perhaps establish areas in already
degraded habitats where guest species populations can be maintained. This was
suggested early in the goat removal project and could have eased public reaction to
the goat elimination effort.503 Building on the North American Model of Wildlife
Conservation, hunting fees could cover both the establishment of new hunting areas
and mitigation for the listed species, by diverting part of the license fee to pay for
mitigation. This could be accomplished via Section 7 consultations (for any involved
federal agencies) or via Section 10 incidental take permits. However, a cleaner
solution would involve federal legislation recognizing and “naturalizing” select
guest species, a form of the “white listing” of approved species suggested in other
settings.504 Neither of these solutions addresses the problem of indirect take via state
regulation of hunting, a la Palila, but that problem is ultimately not a problem of
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native species versus guest species but instead results from implementation of the
ESA. Appropriate regulatory guidance could constrain these suits.
For Melinda Benson, resilience is “the capacity of a system to absorb a
spectrum disturbance and reorganize so as to retain essentially the same function,
structure, and feedbacks—to have the same identity.”505 She puts “the emphasis in
resilience thinking . . . on understanding the dynamics and complexities of the
[social-ecological systems], not on determining and then maintaining a fixed system
state. The emphasis is building adaptive capacity rather than maintaining
stationarity.”506 Robinson would frame this concept “as a duty[:] ‘states shall sustain
and enhance characteristics of resilience within all systems under their jurisdiction
or control.’ This definition would extend to human socio-economic systems,
ecosystems, and other nature phenomena such as hydrologic systems.”507 In light of
this principle, eliminating guest species from habitats where they are thriving, where
they are not unduly impacting native species, and where native species are not likely
to persist seems like a strange decision. It seems foolish to give up something that
works and is resilient for something that does not.
This would not apply in the case of the goats, where the goats themselves are
dangerously destabilizing the ecosystem. But in the case of the striped bass in the
Delta, the bass are not destabilizing the system. They are fulfilling a natural predator
role, distinguished only by their anthropogenic origin, and absent the striped bass,
another predator would likely take up the slack. Getting rid of a species like this
weakens the system and reduces its resilience. “Some observers argue that the
globalization of so many species is reducing the diversity of ecological systems
worldwide because so many of them are becoming occupied by similar species,”508
but many of these new populations are on new evolutionary trajectories and may
eventually become species in their own right. And if not, having a successful species
in an ecosystem is still an improvement over a depauperate system. Although
invasive species can sometimes destabilize a system and are more inclined to do so
than species in a coevolved ecosystem, “[t]he growing number of observations of
rapid adaptation in novel ecosystems . . . , together with the phenomenon of ‘native
invaders,’ . . . suggest that the harms associated with non-native species are not
inevitable outcomes of their history or biology.”509 Some ecologists use this idea to
reconsider nonnative species from a different viewpoint, one that does not rely on
their place of origin. “Thus, the phenomenon we usually refer to as ‘invasive species’
can instead be considered a general process of species undergoing population
irruptions . . . . Within community ecology, population irruptions and their
consequences are well-known responses to the loss of top-down regulation . . . .”510
Native species like the spruce beetle, responsible for killing millions upon millions
of trees in the west, or the overpopulated whitetail deer in the Midwest or the elk in
505
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Yellowstone would be recognized as threats in need of control in this view, on the
same plane as the goats in Hawaii. This approach puts the emphasis back on
ecosystem resilience, not on the origin of the species in the ecosystem. This seems
particularly appropriate for our many novel ecosystems, where no species can truly
be said to be native, at least in the sense that no species evolved in that novel
ecosystem.
In the end, perhaps this is all guest species require—to be weighed on their own
merits, without a finger on the scale due to their anthropogenic origin. Like some
native species, some guest species—goats, pigs, northern pike in some habitats, for
example—present such a danger that they should be strictly limited or, when
possible, eliminated. Certainly, given the history of nonnative species, the default
view of nonnative species should still be one of suspicion,511 and new introductions
should be assiduously avoided. But from a policy perspective, for some guest
species, the good guests that we have made a part of our ecosystem and culture, it is
time to remove the guest label altogether and consider them natives of our new
nature.
Many existing guest species do little harm, fit well in the ecosystems they have
joined, and should be allowed to persist and even be conserved. A longstanding
metaphor considers an ecosystem like a watch, and cautions that every part likely
plays a role, even if we cannot discern the role for every piece of the system.
Similarly, as we go about the tricky business of building and managing new watches
in the age of the Anthropocene, we would be well-served not to throw away pieces
just because we do not like how those pieces got to the repair table in the first place.
We must evaluate guest species on their own merits.512
V. CONCLUSIONS
The separatist view, which considers humans as something outside of
ecosystem, inheres in our longstanding philosophy of the balance nature and in our
environmental laws based on that philosophy. But the separatist view is actually a
false dichotomy and leads us astray in our conservation efforts. In the age of the
Anthropocene, when human impacts are more evident and human management of
ecosystems more important than ever before, this view cannot survive. This false
dichotomy leads to a general bias against nonnative species; in order to provide a
clean break from this bias and begin a new narrative over select nonnative species,
511
Richardson & Ricciardi, supra note 109, at 1463 (responding to the argument that
“[t]he biogeographic origin of a species has no bearing on its impact. The native/nonnative
dichotomy holds no value to science. Therefore, these factors should not guide management,
and there is no rationale for invasion science,” with the response that “[i]gnoring
biogeographic origins as a mediator of impact ignores the importance of evolutionary context
in species interactions. Non-native consumers inflict greater damage on native populations.
The more ‘alien’ an established animal, plant or microbe is to its recipient community, the
greater the likelihood it will be ecologically disruptive.”).
512
This leaves unresolved the question of how conflicting values can be addressed
under this more pragmatic approach to guest species, a question requiring additional long
term consideration.

2018]

OUR APPROACH TO BIODIVERSITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE

235

we need to embrace the neologism “guest species” for those naturalized nonnative
species which humans have introduced, intentionally or accidently, and which we
actively conserve because we benefit from having them in the wild.
These species are caught up in many legal or policy conflicts, because they raise
federalism concerns based on the conflict between the states’ traditional role in
wildlife management and federal efforts aimed at broader conservation; because
some members of the public have a strong financial or cultural interest in
maintaining wild populations of these species; and because guest species often play
important roles in novel or heavily impacted ecosystems where native species may
have trouble persisting. Based on three in-depth case studies of these species, I
extracted six lessons about guest species: (1) federal oversight of state wildlife
management breeds conflict; (2) court ordered removal is the wrong remedy; (3)
people love their guest species and this increases conflicts; (4) guest species can
eventually become part of their new ecosystem; (5) guest species may be better
adapted for the current environment than native species; and (6) existing approaches
to guest species are not working. Emerging principles of environmental management
for the Anthropocene need additional development and study, but my initial review
suggest that they offer some support for the idea that guest species should not be
undervalued solely based on their origin. I conclude that considering “both negative
and positive potential effects of nonnative species,” without consideration of their
place of origin, will lead to better environmental outcomes.513
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